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Abdessamad Belhaj
Pragmatics
of Islamic Law: on Vague=
ness, Intents
and Norms
&=
nbsp; In a recent study on Law and
Language, Timothy Endicott wrote that “systematic attempts to use
philosophical insights about language to solve problems in philosophy of law
are recent, and are a distinctive feature of modern English-speaking
jurisprudence”.[1] Such a claim would be
irrelevant in the tradition of Islamic law. There is strong evidence to sup=
port
the presence of “philosophical insights” imported from Islamic
theology and used to solve linguistic problems of Islamic law. The Muslim l=
egal
theorists looked at legal reasoning, istidlāl<=
/i>
as a process involving the jurist, al-mustadill
who should look in the sources of law, adilla for signification, al-dalāla. Being a linguistic question, al-<=
span
class=3DSpellE>dalāla became the core of the development of
Islamic legal theory as early as the ninth century. Muslim legal theorists
since Muhammad b. Idrīs al-Shāfi`ī
(d. 204/820) have developed patterns of perceiving a structural relationship
between Islamic law and Arabic language. In the footsteps of al-Shāfi`ī, the authors in the discipline of <=
span
class=3DSpellE>usūl al-fiqh have
included in their books what is called `al-muqaddim=
a
´l-lughawiyya', the linguistic
introduction. This often precedes the study of legal sources and deals with=
the
meanings of legal terms or commands, mabāhith<=
/i>
al-alfāz (called also al-dalālāt). Abu Ish&=
#257;q
b. Mūsā al-Sh=
57;tibī
(d. 790/1388) went further devoting several sections to Arabic language and=
its
connection to Islamic law. I suggest elaborating on the contributions of al=
-Shāfi`ī and al-Shā=
;tibī
as two examples representing the school of theologians =
( tarīqat al-mutakallimīn)
in Islamic legal theory. Then, I will discuss a third case of the pragmatic=
s of
Islamic law taken from the school of the jurists (t=
arīqat
al-fuqahā´). The methodology =
of
this school is considered less theoretical and is focusing on deduction of
rules out of juridical cases. Since then, its interest lays in the fact that
even in such a “positivist” school of legal theory, the questio=
n of
language has been of high importance.
Vagueness: al-Sh=
7;fi`ī
on Legal Terms
Probably,
al-Shāfi`ī is the first jurist who de=
veloped
a theory on legal signification. In this regard, classical manuals of usūl al-fiqh
did consider the signification of legal terms, dal&=
#257;lāt
al-alfāz as the major contribut=
ion of
al-Shāfi`ī. Indeed, for al-
Al-Shāfi`ī did not see bayān
as a mere explanation or a description of the legal discourse, but looked a=
t it
as being free from vagueness. To illustrate this one can think of the liter=
ary
meaning of bayān, evoking the limpi=
dity
of the formula. Bernand thought that bayān of al-Shāfi`ī
was rather about a nomenclature which establishes a founded hierarchy
between the sources of law, resting on a fideist
postulate without any final purpose.[4] This manner of seeing =
the
clarity of legal discourse is similar to that of eloquence, bayān
the goal of which is not only to show, but also to persuade. In fact, this
opinion contradicts the report of J. Lowry for whom bayān,
as it was used by al-Shāfi`ī, represe=
nts a
statement, communication, or address in Arabic from God to someone.[5] God communicates his
standards in manners which are exclusively structured by the Qur’ān and Sunna=
i>
(separately or jointly), or by the inference based on them. Undoubtedly, al=
-Shāfi`ī insisted on the communicability of =
the bayān but he did not separate the message=
from
the medium as Lowry states. The bridge between bay&=
#257;n
as a message and as a medium is not absent in al-Sh=
57;fi`ī’s
system. He clearly raised the question of kayfa=
´l-bayān, which is a question ab=
out
the media of bayān, mentioni=
ng
them in the following order: are the Qur’ān=
(by specific or by general statements), the Sunna=
i>
(by clarification of the Qur’ān or b=
y the
initiation of legal statements) and the ijtihā=
d
(clarification by analogy). Taken as such, the divergence between Bernand and Lowry fades away since both of them focus=
ed on bayān, which lead them either to l=
ook at
it as a juridical organization of sources of law or rather as a literary
elucidation. In my view, Arabic language is the explanatory variable of al-=
Shāfi`ī’s system where Arabic languag=
e is
both a literary excellent “proof” of the validity of the Qur’ān and a clear legal discourse. Thus, =
we can
draw the conclusion that bayān is b=
oth a
literary excellence and a tool of legal communication. Throughout the five
media of bayān, al-Shāfi`ī seems going beyond organizin=
g the
sources of Islamic law. In his piece of work, the ultimate medium of the bayān is Arabic language.
After
explaining the five media of bayān<=
i>, al-Shāfi`ī’ stated that God has addresse=
d His
Book to the Arabs in their tongue in accordance with the meanings known to
them, including the extensiveness of Arabic. Here comes the pragmatic shift
where he deals with dalālāt=
al-alfāz as a set of textual relations
“adapted” to the audience (the Arabs). For instance, in accorda=
nce
to the extensive character of Arabic, God in his Book expresses something, =
part
of which is literally general and which is intended to be obviously general=
. In
other cases, he states something literally general in which the particular =
is
included or the general is meant to be the particular.[6] He concluded that
knowledge of all this was to be found either in the beginning of what is sa=
id
or in the middle or at the end. This is because the Arabs may begin the sub=
ject
of a speech whose first word makes the last clear; and they may begin a spe=
ech
whose last word makes the first clear.[7] Indeed, each
time he deals with one of the media of bayān=
i>
al-Shāfi`ī repeats that the significa=
tion
of texts belonging to a specific category is self-evident for those who know
the language of Arabs.
My contention concerning al-Risāla is that al-Sh=
57;fi`ī
is establishing Arabic language as the supreme medium of communication and =
the
reference in juridical debates. This raises the question of the limits of
interpretation. Why would al-Shāfi`ī =
limit
the reception of the Qur’ānic and
Prophetic discourses? Probably he was motivated by his controversies with
Muhammad b. al-Hasan al-Sh=
aybānī
(d.189/ 805), the pupil of Abu Hanīfa al-<=
span
class=3DSpellE>Nu`mān b. Thābit (d.
150/767) who tended to use analogy excessively, going beyond what Arabic
language rules allow. Al-Shāfi`ī made=
this
clear when he stated that no one at all should give an opinion on a specific
matter by merely saying: it is permitted or prohibited, unless he is certai=
n of
the legal knowledge. If the jurist lacks knowledge of Arabic language, he
should not be allowed to apply analogy, for he would be lacking in the tool=
by
which he applies analogy. At this level, qiyās=
was not used in cases where the interpretation of legal rulings went beyond
textual boundaries as has been claimed. Indeed, al-Shāfi`ī saw in language a too=
l which
defines the boundaries of analogy. S. Gu
confirms that al-Shāfi`ī excluded the=
use
of qiyās as a means to criticise and
question established legal tradition. In this way, he subordinated opinion =
to
the principles established by legal texts.[8]
Going
back to T. Endicott, the question of vagueness has been one of the major pr=
oblems
of law and language he focused on. Vagueness in law, as he understands it, =
is a
character of borderline cases in which one just does not know whether to ap=
ply
the expression or to withhold it.[9] He identifies pragmatic vagueness =
as the
following situation: picture two different requests: (=
i)
that you come to see me at 5 o’clock, and (ii) that you come to see m=
e at
about 5 o’clock. Now suppose that you come to see me at 5.05. Have you
done what I asked you to do? We can say that the requirements that arise fr=
om
the two requests depend on the context, and that any vagueness in the
requirements of request (i) is ‘pragmatic
vagueness’, and that the requirements of request (ii), conversely, ma=
y be
pragmatically precise.[10]<=
/a>
Let’s
consider now a famous example given by the jurists for the ‘vagueness=
of
law’. In a tradition narrated by Muhammad b. Ism=
ā`īl al-Bukhār=
9;
(d. 256/ 870), the Prophet addressed his companions: "None of you shou=
ld
carry out his mid-afternoon prayer except at (arrival at) Banū
Quraydha”.<=
span
class=3DMsoFootnoteReference> =
span>[11]
When the mid-afternoon prayer time came, some of them said we will not make=
the
prayer unless we rich the Banū Quraydha because, in their understanding, the Prophet
wanted them to make the prayer “only” in B=
anū
Quraydha. Others made the prayer in its time ma=
king
the point that what the Prophet asked was to “go quickly” to Banū Quraydha “=
;before
the prayer of mid-afternoon”. Therefore, if they cannot be there then
there is no need to postpone the prayer of mid-afternoon. The legal theoris=
t Taqī al-Dīn M. =
b. A. Ibn al-Najjār (d. 97=
2/1564) said
that here we had case of “specification of the general by using
analogy”.[12]
In the words of Endicott, one would say that the legal command here of
performing the prayer before arrival at Banū Quraydha is characterised by pragmatic vagueness. The
attitude of those who made the prayer in its time turned out to be
pragmatically precise.
Al-Shātibī=
on the intents of Islamic law
&nbs=
p; One
of the most interesting contributions in legal theory that deal with langua=
ge
and law has been that of Andrei Marmor. Marmor’s views have been labelled as the Intent=
ion
Thesis. He raised the question of the eventual role played by legislative
intent in statutory interpretation. Marmor defi=
nes the
interpretation of law as the imposition of meaning on an object. He explains
that the elements of an interpretation include (i)
the meaning of the object; (ii) what the author means by the object (meaning
that); and (iii) what the object means to the interpreter (meaning for).[13] =
Marmor
argued that the authoritative nature of law accounts for the conceptual rol=
e intentions
play in identifying legal norms as such.=
[14]
The
specialists of Islamic legal studies would not consider the ideas of Marmor as new or more
sophisticated than those of al-Shātibī. One
can mention several other jurists that offered fundamental and decisive
contributions to the theory of maqāsid
al-sharī'a, intents of Islamic law as =
Abū Hāmid al-Ghazzālī (d. 505/1111), Fakhr
al-Dīn al-Rāz=
99;
(d. 606/1209) or Sayf al-D=
īn
al-Āmidī (d. 631/1233). However, al-<=
span
class=3DSpellE>Shātibī formulated a complete theory on whi=
ch I
suggest here to shed light. He examined this question at three levels: first
the tools of ijtihād, then t=
he
finalities of the law and finally the legal discourse itself.
When
dealing with the conditions of ijtihād,
al-Shātibī did not adopt the traditio=
nally
accepted juristic view that considers Arabic language a necessary condition=
for
a mujtahid. He said that nothing would be
acceptable from a mujtahid unless he rea=
ches
in Arabic the level of the imāms. F=
or al-Shātibī, the im=
7;ms
in Arabic are the linguists such as al-Khal=
9;l
b. Ahmad (d. circa 170/786) or Abū Bishr `Amr b. `Uthmān Sībawayhi (d.
180/796). In his concept, the degree of the imā=
;ms
in Arabic implies to be able of tahrīr
al-fahm (ascertaining the understanding) as=
good
as a native speaker of Arabic. The argumentation of al-Shātibī
goes this way: sharī`<=
/span>a
was revealed in Arabic for an audience of Arabs. Therefore, only those who =
can
understand Arabic language at the highest level are able to understand Islamic law accurately.
Therefore, a beginner in Arabic is a beginner in understanding sharī`a=
as
well. Similarly, if someone has reached the highest level in mastering Arab=
ic,
he should be an expert in understanding sharī`a
at the same level. Thus, he becomes an authority, h=
ujja
in understanding Islamic law just like the
companions, Sahāba. Whoever is unab=
le to
reach this level, his shortage of understanding sharī`a equals the difference
between him and the companions of the Prophet in Arabic. As long as someone=
has
this shortage, he would not be an authority and his opinions are inacceptable.[15]
Concerning
the legal discourse itself, al-Shātibī
first calls us to accept his statement “sharī`a is conveyed in
Arabic”. If we agree with his reasoning, we should follow the styles =
of
Arabic language, maslak kalām
al-`Arab, in our legal deduction and argumentation. In addition<=
i>,
we should respect the manners of Arabs in their speech, manāzi`uhā
fī anwā` =
mukhātabātihā. He criticized those=
who
use reason in their dealing with the proofs of the Qur=
’ān
ignoring thus the convention of language. If one follows the reason and not=
the
convention, the result would be a deviation from the finalities of Islamic =
law
(khurūj `an<=
/span> maqsūd al-shar`)=
.[16] The emphasis of al-Shātibī on the importance of respecting the
limits and rules of Arabic language is a condition for understanding the
objectives behind Islamic legal texts. It is the Arabic tongue, as al-Shātibī puts, which translates the higher
objectives of the Lawgiver.
To
grasp the meaning of the higher objectives of Islamic law, a mujtahid should look at Arabic language in its
function of signification, al-dalāla.
According to al-Shātibī, in Arabic, t=
here
are two ways to understand words. On the one hand, there are words and
expressions that have primary meanings, al-dalā=
;la
al-asliyya form the final purpose of the
speakers. This signification is not specific to any nation and is shared by
all, as he explained through the example of ‘=
qiyām
Zayd’.[17] If we assume that
What
is stimulating in al-Shātibī’s =
views
on the link between Arabic language and Islamic law remains his dialogue wi=
th
al-Shāfi`ī on this specific question.
Following Y. Suleiman, al-Shāfi`ī bel=
ieved
that a Muslim stopped to be an Arab if he has no competence in the language=
. He
would become an Arab if he masters the language. In opposition to him, al-<=
span
class=3DSpellE>Shātibī argues that linguistic competence in
Arabic does not make a person ethnically Arab.[20] Nevertheless, he seem=
s to
be largely influenced by al-Shāfi`ī’s<=
/span>
ideas when defining the implications of the statement that “sharī`a is Arabic=
”.
Besides, al-Shāfi`ī addressed most of=
the
characteristics of Arabic put forward by al-Shāti=
bī.
It is true for the categories of signification, such as the "general a=
nd
the particular," "the equivocal and the univocal”, and
"the role of context in identifying evidence”. Despite the simil=
ar
views of al-Shāfi`ī and al-Shātibī on the link between Arabic and Isla=
mic
law, there is one major difference. The first understands this link as an
expression of bayān. This me=
ans
that sources of Islamic law are forms of communicating legal judgmen=
ts.
Arabic intervenes here as a means of communication or explanation of the di=
vine
commands. The central idea in al-Shātibī’s thought is not communicatio=
n from
the divine to the human. Rather, he considers Arabic as a way of understand=
ing
the finalities of Islamic law, maqāsid =
al-sharī`a. Therefore, the addressee is the cen=
tral
‘interpreter’ of the intents of law.
Furthermore, al-Shātibī
puts the addressee of the legal command, mukallaf=
i>
in the center of the legal discourse, khitā=
;b
al-shar`. Therefore, the addressee should b=
e able
to understand the intents of law, maqāsid<=
/span>
al-sharī`a., by the means of Arabic
language. Al-Shātibī distinguishes be=
tween
the intents of the legislator, qasd a=
l-shāri` and the intents of the addressee of t=
he
legal command, qasd al-mukallaf.
He mentioned four types of the intents of the legislator: (i) the legislator’s intents in establishing the=
Law;
(ii) the legislator’s intents in establishing the Law for the
people’s understanding; (iii) the legislator’s intents in estab=
lishing
the Law as a standard of conduct and (iv) the
legislator’s intents in bringing human beings under the Law’s
jurisdiction.[21]
Al-Shātibī details also the intents o=
f the
addressee of the legal command. He states that actions are inseparable from
intentions, and objectives are to be taken in consideration when judging
behaviour, whether in the realm of worship or mundane transactions and
activities. He adds if an action is associated with its intention, then
action-based rulings (al-ahkām al-taklīfiyya) will apply to it. If it is strip=
ped of
its intentions, nothing applies to it, as in the case of actions performed =
by
individuals who are asleep, unconscious and insane.[22]
Banned language in alfāz
al-kufr
&nb=
sp; Muslim
jurists, especially those who belong to the Hanafite=
span>
and the Hanbalite schools developed a juridical=
genre
called alfāz al-ku=
fr,
blasphemy expressions. This literature scrupulously defines the words that =
are
discussed in the category of kufr called=
al-kufr al-qawlī or=
al-kufr al-lafzī. S=
ometimes
theologians discuss the same category under other denominations such as =
al-nutq bi alfāz al-Björkman (relying on Brocke=
lmann)
hardly said anything about it except for mentioning the title Jāmi` alfāz<=
/span>
al-kufr in his bibliography for the entry &=
#8220;Kāfir” in the =
Encyclopedia
of Islam. In his “Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong=
”,
M. Cook was aware of the existence of this literature but he was satisfied =
with
citing in a footnote Badr al-Rashīd
who produced one of the classic treatises on the words of blasphemy.[24] The flourishing
conservative Islamic literature has helped the Islamic scholarship, especia=
lly
modern Hanbalism, to edit many texts but without
going beyond religious considerations. So far, the study of N. al-Tikriti on “hifz
al-lisān `an lafz al-īmān wa ´llāh al-hādī ilā <=
span
class=3DSpellE>şirāt al-jīnan”
by Şehzade Korkud,
remains the most achieved work on a scientific level in English language. A=
l-Tikriti states that any individual guilty of showing
certain obvious signs of kufr known with
certainty is to be judged for kufr.
Authorities (meaning in his study Ottoman authorities) are to judge such si=
gns
just as jurists do: as proof of one’s interior lack of belief. He
confirms that jurists set the stage for the religious sanctioning of
governmental action against those who are defined by the state as apostates=
.[25] I will show in this s=
ection
that alfāz al-kufr
contains, essentially, some of the ambiguities of legal discourse as much a=
s it
turns around the complexities of intentions behind speech.
First,
I would like to discuss the links that alfāz=
i>
al-kufr sets up with religious and literary
sciences in Islam. In theology, the literature of a=
lfāz
al-kufr has effects on religious identifica=
tion,
since pronouncing blasphemous words ranges one in the camp of unbelievers.
Generally, alfāz al-kufr deals with some of the sensitive subjects in
Islamic theology. One of them is the subject of al-=
asmā´
wa-l-şifāt (names and attributes =
of
God) and sabb al-rasūl
(insulting the Prophet, which infers insulting Islam, =
sabb
al-islām). Ibn Taymiyya has written an influential book entitled =
Al-Şārim al-maslūl=
span> `alā shātim al-<=
span
class=3DSpellE>rasūl on this topic. Knowing that al-asmā´ wa
´l-şifāt is the core of Isl=
amic
theology, avoiding these words is necessary. Hence the =
use of
ilhād to denominate those who deny =
the
names or attributes of God. As an example, let us cite a sentence me=
ntioned
by the Māturīdite Abu ´l-Ma`ālī Mas`ūd b. `Abd al-`Azīz in his =
Risāla fī alfāz al-kufr. If someone says that God is in the sky and=
that
he means by “in” the place, then he blasphemes.[26] This sentence
wouldn’t be classified by a Hanbalite as
disbelief since Hanbalites approve the directio=
n (jiha), the location (m=
akān)
and the descent (nuzūl) of God.
&nbs=
p; On
a legal level, fiqh is discussing the
juridical outcomes for someone who blasphemes. An immediate result is to fi=
nd himself excluded from the community. Exclusion can tak=
e the
form of divorce, prison or death. In this regard, one of the most interesti=
ng
sentences of blasphemy is when a man says that (the sultan of our time is j=
ust).
As explained by al-Rashīd, the sultan of o=
ur
time is unjust (by definition) and the injustice is prohibited in Islam. Abu
´l-Ma`ālī mentioned an o=
ther
example; if the sultan sneezes, an=
d a
man tells him “God bless you”, then another man says to the fir=
st
one that he should not say that to the sultan, he blasphemes. The second man
referred to the fact that the sentence `yarhamuka=
i>
Allāh' could be used also for condolen=
ces
(and that implies the death of the sultan).[27] The piety of the lawy=
er
does not accept making an exception for this rule just because it involves a
sultan. Thus, the claiming of al-Tikriti mentio=
ned
above needs review since alfāz al-kufr contains usually a chapter criticizing the s=
ultans
and the political authorities.
&nbs=
p; As
far as the literary aspect is concerned, one has to deal with mostly rhetor=
ical
figures. I will limit myself to Risāla
fī alfāz<=
/i>
al-kufr of Badr=
al-Rashīd. In the chapter entitled faşl
fi ´l-kufr şarīhan wa
kināyatan, the author deals with plain
expressions and metonymies. Actually, the examples that he gives rel=
ate
rather to the category of tashbīh
(comparison). The best-known example is the following: (somebody who says m=
y belief
is as that of Pharaoh blasphemes).[28] We know that this
particular sentence has created a debate between the followers of Ibn `Arabī and his
opponents. Again, Ibn Taym=
iyya
wrote a treatise entitled Risāla=
fī īmān Fir`awn against Ibn &=
acute;Arabī. However, others defended him such =
as Jalāl al-Dīn al=
-Dawwānī, who authored a treatise with the s=
ame
title.[29]
&nbs=
p;
Finally, the continuity of this genre in the modern Hanbalite
jurisprudence deserves attention. Bakr Abū Zayd, an outstan=
ding Hanbalite jurist and theologian, has published a dict=
ionary
entitled “Mu`jam al-manāhi ´l-lafziyya”.
He was able to collect 1500 banned expressions but very few examples are mo=
dern
ones. One of them is the following sentence (religion for God and homeland =
for
all).[30] Liberal Muslims have
adopted this slogan since the 19th century. Thus, when B. Abū Zayd added that =
(this
sentence leads necessarily to apostasy may God save us), he is using it as =
an
identification mechanism as much as he is excluding the basis of modern
citizenship.
The legal literature of alfāz al-kufr
is a result of a strong sense of normativity in=
law,
the same problem discussed by modern legal philosophers, such as Endicott a=
nd
H. L. A. Hart. If the law of a community is a guide to the conduct of its m=
embers,
one easy way to express this abstract feature of law is by pointing out that
the law can be stated by making normative statements. These statements use
expressions like ‘obligation’, ‘right’,
‘must’, ‘may’.[31] The Muslim jurists di=
scussed
the normative statements such as the imperative and prohibitive forms (siyagh al-amr=
i> wa ´l-nahy). They went further and distinguished between
normative statements, which belong to the category of =
wujūb
(‘obligation’), and others to nadb<=
/span>
('recommendation')[32]. They also =
stated
that commands could indicate even permissibility (i=
bāha).[33]
In sum, Islamic legal theory=
has
discussed three main questions that interest modern legal theory: vagueness=
, intents
and normativity. In all these issues, the empha=
sis
was put on the structural relationship between Arabic language and Islamic =
law.
Yet, one cannot assume that legal theorists in Islam have removed the many
ambiguities in Islamic law. Also, the theory of intents of law, maqāsid al-shar=
299;`a
flourished, mainly, in the western part of the Muslim world, among Mālikis of al-Andalus and
[1] Endicott, Timothy, "La= w and Language", in: The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (= Tue Jun 3, 2008 Edition) at: http://plato.stanford.edu
[2] Audebert, C-F., "I`jāz<=
/i> et
sacralisation.
[4] Bernand, Marie, "Bayān selon les usūliyy= ūn", Arabica, Vol.= 42, No. 2, 1995, p. 150.
[5] Lowry, Joseph E., "Som= e Preliminary Observations on al-Shāfi`ī and Later = Usūl al-Fiqh: The Case of the Term bayānxe "bayÁn"", Arabica, Vol.= 55, No. 5-6, 2008, p. 507.
[6] Al-Shāfi`ī, Muhammad b. Idrīs, Al-Risāla, p. 95.
[7] Al-Shāfi`ī, Muhammad b. Idrīs, Al-Risāla, p.= 95.
[8] Gu, Sharron, The boundaries=
of
meaning and the formation of law: legal concepts and reasoning in the Engli=
sh,
Arabic, and Chinese traditions,
[9] Endicott, Timothy, Vagueness in Law,
[10] Idem, p. 50.
[11] Al-Buk= hārī, Muhammad b. Ismā`īl, Al-Jāmi` al-sah= 99;h, Ed. Mustafā Dīb<= /span> al-Bughā, Damascus-Beirut, Dār Ibn Kathīr, 19= 87, Vol. 4, p. 1510.
[12] Ibn al-Najjār, Taqī al= -Dīn, Sharh= al-kawkab al-munīr,= Ed. M. Mustafā Zuhaylī= , Nazīh Ḥammād, Riyadḥ, Maktabat al-`Ubaykān, 1993, Vol. III, p. 381.
[15]
[16] Idem, Vol. I,= p. 44.
[17] Al-Sh&=
#257;tibī
is drawing here on a question discussed by Arab philosophers. M. M=
aró=
span>th summarized its contents in the following way:&nbs=
p;“ If walking dhah=
i>ābun, is a
property that can be found in Zayd (yuqālu fī zayd), then the following sentences can be derive=
d from
it: Zayd is walking (zaydun
dhāhibun, zayd=
un
yadhhabu). Walking (dhāhibun,
yadhhabu) is derived from =
the
act of walking (dhahābun), which the
property is being in Zayd. Conseq=
uently,
all utterances have the same basic form: substance (the first one among
Aristotle’s categories) is connected with (or: is a bearer of) a prop=
erty
(one of the other nine categories). Thus, the ever-changing linguistic
expression of this elementary structure is of secondary importance because<=
i> zaydun dhāhibun,=
zaydun yadhhabu=
and
yadhhabu zaydun are
various linguistic representations of the same structure consisting of subj=
ect
and predicate”.
Maróth, M.
[18] Al-Shātibī, Abū Ishāq, Al-Muwāfaq= 257;t fī usūl a= l-sharī`a, Vol. II, p. 66.
[19] Idem, p. 67.
[21] Al-Shātibī, Abū Ishāq, Al-Muwāfaq= 257;t fī usūl a= l-sharī`a, Vol. II, p. 5.
[22] Idem, pp. 323-324.
[23] Imber<=
/span>,
C., Ebu's-Suúd: the Islamic Le=
gal
Tradition,
[25] Al-Tik=
riti,
Nabil, "Kalam<=
/span>
in the Service of State: Apostasy Rulings and the Defining of Ottoman Commu=
nal
Identity," in: Legitimizing the Order: Ottoman Rhetoric of State Po=
wer,
Eds. Hakan T. Karateke and Maurus Reinkowski,
[26] Abu ´l-Ma`ālī,
Mas`ūd b. `Abd=
al-`Azīz, Risāla fī alfāz al-
[27] Idem, p. 482.
[28] Al-Ras= hīd, Badr, Alfāz al-kufr, in: Al-J= 257;mi` fī alfāz = al-kufr, p.71
[29] This controversy has been discussed by E. Ormsby in “The=
Faith
of Pharaoh: a Disputed Question in Islamic Theology”, Studia
Islamica, Vol. 98-99, 2004, pp. 5-28.
[30] Abū Zayd=
span>, Bakr,
Mu`jam al-manāhi
´l-lafziyya,
Leiden