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Miklós
Könczöl
Problems
of Justice and Community in the Discourse on Future Generations
The present=
essay
aims to point out the importance of two concepts—those of justice and
community—in the contemporary discourse on future generations. Its ai=
m cannot
be to explore these immense domains thoroughly. What follows here is but a
brief overview, featuring some of the most important authors of the field. I
intend to scrutinize some basic notions of their theories, showing how they=
make
part of their different approaches of the same problem, but also the questi=
ons
that are left unanswered by them.[1]=
&=
nbsp; First,
I am going to deal with two possible interpretations of justice in a liberal
discourse. The first one (that of J. Rawls) draws on the conception of just=
ice
as reciprocity, while the other (that of B. Barry) puts forward the idea of
justice as impartiality. Accordingly, Rawls’ theory is bound to a
particular community, whereas Barry’s is a more universal one.
Nevertheless, both authors concentrate on the principles of justice, leaving
open some questions about the interpretation of community.
&=
nbsp; In
the second part of my essay, I turn to the concept of community, as seen fr=
om
the perspective of some communitarian authors. Their respective theories fo=
cus
on the description of the links that bind together the (present and future)
members of a certain community.
1 Justice
In the firs=
t part
of the present essay, two theories are taken as starting point: those of J.
Rawls and B. Barry. Both authors represent the egalitarian current of liber=
al
political philosophy: the meaning of that comes clear if we oppose this
description to utilitarianism on the one hand, and to the libertarian (or
market-based) current of liberalism on the other hand.
Utilitarian
theories try to find a suitable way for maximizing aggregate utility. Liber=
al
theories of justice, however, cannot embrace that objective, as they attrib=
ute
some basic rights to the individuals that must not be compromised for the s=
ake
of aggregate utility.[2]=
Moreover, it is very hard to conceive of anything that is
‘aggregate’ in the case of future generations, where one has to
deal with a virtually unlimited time horizon: the interests of an infinite
number of future people would necessarily overweigh the interests of the
presently living. Libertarianism, in its turn, can be distinguished from
egalitarian theories by its strict opposition to state interventions differ=
ent
from the protection of individuals’ (negative) rights. Libertarians
therefore do not pay particular attention to future generations, since they
hold the view that the rights of a present individual cannot be limited with
respect to the welfare of people not yet existing, and that future generati=
ons
will be best served if the present generation does everything for the perfe=
ct
functioning of the market.[3]=
What follows from these oppositions is that the theories of both Rawls and
Barry concentrate on individuals, their rights and interests, while maintai=
ning
the possibility of some intervention in market relations for accomplishing =
just
distribution of burdens and benefits in the society.
1.1 A Contr=
act
Under the Veil
In his 1971=
book,
A Theory of Justice, the American philosopher J. Rawls develops a
contractarian theory aimed to describe the principles, institutions, and en=
ds
of a just society.[4]
Considering the huge amount of scholarly literature on this theory, there i=
s no
need for reconstructing in its entirety what Rawls says. Therefore, I am go=
ing
to confine myself to the features of his theory that are the most important=
for
the problem of future generations.
1.1.1 The
Principle of Just Savings
Raws does explicitly deal with justice to future generations within =
his
discussion of distributive justice. According to his theory, there are two
principles of just distribution:
First:
each person is to have a right to the most extensive basic liberty compatib=
le
with similar liberty for others. [...]
Social and
economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the
greatest benefit of the least advantaged and (b) attached to offices and
positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. (60=
and
83)
Now, in order to make it possible to accomplish these principles and
render the situation of the least advantaged acceptable,
[e]ach gene=
ration
must not only preserve the gains of culture and civilization, and maintain
intact those just institutions that have been established, but it must also=
put
aside in each period of time a suitable amount of real capital accumulation.
(285)
The amount of this accumulation, the just savings rate, is one of the
questions the members of a given generation have to agree upon. But in orde=
r to
ensure impartiality in terms of justice between generations, the contracting
parties—being under the veil of ignorance[5]=
—do
not know which generation they belong to: thus, Rawls says, ‘they hav=
e to
choose a just savings principle that assigns an appropriate rate of
accumulation to each level of advance.’ (287, emphasis added) =
It is important to note that Rawls endorses a rath=
er
optimistic view on general progression: he conceives of a world where it is
only a question of capital accumulation when a society can reach the state =
of
justice, where its members only have to maintain the just institutions crea=
ted
so far.[6]=
1.1.2 A Motivational Assumption
As for the making of the contract, Rawls explicitly says that all the
participants are under the veil of ignorance that prevents them from knowing
which generation they belong to (i.e. what place their generation will take=
in
the history of humankind), but at the same time they are aware of the fact =
that
they all belong to the same generation. This—according to
Rawls—precludes any kind of time preference from the part of those in=
the
original position, without stretching fantasy too far (what would be the ca=
se
if they were members of different generations or if they would not know whe=
ther
they are contemporaries).[7]=
In this way, however, another problem emerges. Giv=
en
that the conditions of justice include a limited self-interest,[8]=
one might wonder—with Rawls—whether the participants of the
contract are not going to determine the principles of justice in a way that
excludes any kind of savings: since they know that they are contemporaries,
they have a perfect opportunity to neglect the interests of future generati=
ons,
who cannot give any sign of their disapproval. Rawls tries to solve this
problem by the way of a psychological ‘motivational assumption.’
According to that,
[t]he parti=
es are
thought of as representing continuing lines of claims, as being so to speak
deputies for a kind of everlasting moral agent or institution. They need not
take into account its entire life span in perpetuity, but their goodwill
stretches over at least two generations. (128)
This formulation has some obvious advantages. First, it corresponds =
to
some kind of ‘domestic intuition’,[9]=
which is paired by a social practice: even if there are people who do not c=
are
about their descendants, and even if previous generations as such do not se=
em to
have cared much about the sustainability of their economic practices, paren=
ts
usually do care for their children, and this is reflected by social (and, in
particular, legal) institutions, as well. Second, one does not have to assu=
me
any kind of immediate link between generations that are distanced far away =
in
time from each other. As generation A feels itself responsible for the welf=
are
of generation B (and C), while generation B has the same sentiments towards
generation C (and D), a chain-like lineage of care comes about. Now, as
generation A is motivated to take the interests of generation B into
consideration when making a contract and choosing the principles for just
savings, and it is at least plausible for them that generation B would like=
wise
take the interests of generation C into consideration, and so on, the
principles to be chosen should be valid for the whole of the ‘everlas=
ting
moral agent or institution.’ Finally, the problem of inter-generation=
al
justice is projected to the level of intra-generational relations,[10]
what broadly corresponds to the fact that it is only within the present
generation where political decisions concerning posterity are made.
However, Rawls’ construction is open to
objections on more points. The most obvious one is that the final guarantee=
of
its functioning is a rather weak one. As one of its critics, B. Barry point=
s it
out, if one intends to speak of a real theory of justice, it has to maintain
its validity without assuming sentiments people might or might not have tow=
ards
their posterity. Liberal political theories usually claim that they can do
without demanding too much from the citizen, and this applies for motivatio=
ns,
as well.[11] Sec=
ond,
if we look at the question from the other side, we could also remark that if
such a sentiment is general in society, it is far from obvious why we need
justice in intergenerational relations. Once the concern for one’s
descendants does exist between any two generations immediately succeeding o=
ne
another, one can intelligibly speak of a ‘chain of love’, as do=
es
J. Passmore.[12] Thi=
rd,
the motivational assumption also implies ‘that having children is par=
t of
every rational plan of life’, i.e. that ‘all participant=
s in
the original position know that they either have children or siblings with
children,’ otherwise the danger of majoritarianism arises.[13]
Fourth, the concept of an ‘everlasting moral agent or institutionR=
17;
seems to contradict the circumstances of justice. Rawls says about the
participants of the contract that ‘[a]s representatives of families t=
heir
interests are opposed as the circumstances of justice imply.’ (128) If
family can become such a privileged place in his theory, the self as depict=
ed
by Rawls is not really an unencumbered one, not even in the field of politi=
cs.
As a consequence, theorists following Rawls usually
try to eliminate his motivational assumption, and look for support in other
parts of the theory. R. Manning argues, for example, that ‘it appears
best to stay with the mutual disinterest. The theory, if it is to be readily
accepted by everyone, cannot be based on duty or obligation, nor on changing
moral values; it must be grounded in the contract and not subject to
sentiment.’[14]
When maintaining mutual disinterest (and remaining faithful to the
circumstances of justice), Manning suggests, one has to recur to the basic =
idea
of Rawls’ theory, i.e. to putting aside natural contingencies. As for
future generations, Rawls does this by prohibiting time preference. But how=
to
include not-yet-born persons to the procedure of the contractual agreement?=
A
possible answer is that future generations are much in a same situation like
children. Since ‘the minimal requirements defining moral personality
refer to a capacity, and not the realization of it,’ (509) there is no
reason, according to Manning, for excluding future generations from the
contract.[15]
Another scholar who develops a Rawlsian theory, H.=
Ph.
Visser ’t Hooft, challenges another part of Rawls’ argument, to=
o.
According to his view, there is no ground for assuming that kind of
generational egoism that ghosts Rawls’ image of the contracting parti=
es.
The aim of making a contract is nothing else but realizing and maintaining a
just society over time, and just intergenerational savings make part of the
institutions of that society. Thus, if the participants are really aware of
what they are doing when making a social contract, there is hardly any
conceptual room for generational egoism.[16]
Rawls still feels the need to solve this problem by introducing the
motivational assumption discussed above. For the reasons why he does so, a
plausible explanation may be found in the comments of B. Barry who puts for=
ward
another conceptual framework for dealing with justice to future generations=
.
1.2 Beyond Reciprocity
For better understanding the underlying assumptions of Rawls’
theory, Barry presents some historical inquiries in order to investigate the
different strains that Rawls tries to hold together and that are responsible
for some widely recognized paradoxes of his theory of justice. He distingui=
shes
two such currents, that are a Kantian (justice as universal hypothetical
assent) and a Humean (justice as rational co-operation) one.[17]
The core of his criticism is focused upon the Humean tradition, and
particularly two of its features: the so-called circumstances of justice,
and—what is a consequence of the former—the conception of justi=
ce
as reciprocity.
1.2.1 The Circumstances of Justice
The most important among the circumstances of justice, as described =
by
Rawls (who follows Hume), are moderate scarcity, moderate selfishness and
relative equality.[18]
Their content might be summarized as follows. Moderate scarcity means the l=
ack
of unlimited abundance of (natural) resources that can be used for satisfyi=
ng
human desires on the one hand, while on the other hand it also means the
absence of such a necessity where ‘the utmost frugality and industry
cannot preserve the greater number from perishing.’[19]
In short: there is something to be distributed but it has to be
distributed.[20] Mod=
erate
selfishness can be understood as a middle way between benevolence and total
(but unintelligent[21])
pursuit of one’s interests: Rawls also gives a negative formulation,
according to which ‘the parties take no interest in one another’=
;s
interests.’ (127) Finally, moderate equality means some kind of
equilibrium of powers. As H. L. A. Hart puts it in his Concept of Law:
‘[n]o individual is so much more powerful than others, that he is abl=
e,
without co-operation, to dominate or subdue them for more than a short
period.’[22] It =
is
under these circumstances, according to Hume and Rawls, that one may
meaningfully speak of justice. ‘On the face of it’—Barry
concludes—’if these are circumstances of justice then things lo=
ok
black for future generations.’[23]
The stability of moderate selfishness notwithstanding, scarcity is likely to
grow with time,[24] whi=
le
one can hardly conceive of any kind of equality between different generatio=
ns
in the Humean sense.[25]
Consequently, there is an important question to be answered if one is worri=
ed
about the fate of future generations, namely, if these circumstances are re=
ally
conditions for the usage of the concept of justice. In order to answer the
question, Barry discusses each of the circumstances, and shows the untenabi=
lity
of the claim that without their presence justice does not have any applicat=
ion.
These circumstances might well be sufficient conditions for creating
rules of justice (according to some historical explanation), but they hardly
qualify as necessary. Thus, even if rules of justice are of social
origin, they may also be used as criteria for the evaluation of societies w=
here
the circumstances of justice are not present. Under an apartheid regime, for
example, it might be true that one—weaker—part of the populatio=
n is
deprived of certain possibilities by another—stronger—part, and
that this deprivation is based exclusively upon some natural contingency. If
the regime is successfully maintained over time by force, one might assume =
that
there is no equality in terms of power. According to the doctrine of
circumstances of justice (understood as necessary conditions), one could not
intelligibly declare that regime as unjust. If one, however, considers these
circumstances to be only sufficient conditions for rules of justice, one ca=
n use
the same criteria to determine the just or unjust nature of any social
institution.[26]
Therefore, Barry suggests that Rawls should be rea=
d as
using this ‘weaker version’ of the doctrine of circumstances of
justice.[27] The
outcome is that ‘we can find out what the principles of justice are by
seeing what regulatory principles would be agreed upon where the circumstan=
ces
of justice obtain.’[28]
In this way, a reasonable theory of justice as rational co-operation may be
constructed, in line with the Humean tradition, but without committing the =
same
errors as Hume. Moreover, if one takes into consideration that Rawls concei=
ves
of a society as a ‘more or less self-sufficient association of
persons’ (4) who are contemporaries (according to the original positi=
on),
the outcome is conciliable with the (Kantian) conception of justice as
hypothetical universal assent (of which the veil of ignorance is a remarkab=
le
feature).[29] If,
however, one leaves that framework, and turns to questions of international=
or
intergenerational justice, consequences of the two conceptions of justice
diverge.[30]
1.2.2 From Reciprocity to Equal Opportunities
According to Barry, the conception of justice as rational co-operati=
on
provides an explanation for some of Rawls’ solutions that seem otherw=
ise
rather strange, namely, the description of the original position and the
motivational assumption. As it was mentioned above, people in the original
position know that they are contemporaries. That being, Rawls has to assume
that they know that they will care for the welfare of their descenda=
nts,
and therefore they will opt for a principle of just savings that serves fut=
ure
generations. Accepting a more Kantian solution would mean that the veil of
ignorance is complete in terms of the temporal position of the persons who =
have
to agree upon the principles of justice, (i.e. they do not know individually
what generation they will belong to)[31]
but Rawls follows another way. This is to be explained with the necessity of
assuming that these people are contemporaries, since otherwise there were no
place for mutual advantages.[32]
Conceding that justice as rational co-operation (o=
r,
more simply, ‘justice as reciprocity’) proves to be an adequate
framework for much of the discussion on the principles of justice, Barry st=
ill
argues that this conception of justice cannot give an account, for example,=
of
the situation before the co-operation, that is, it ‘cannot its=
elf
define a just starting point.’[33]
As a complementary (but independent) criterion, he proposes the conception =
of
justice as equal opportunity.
As for the consequences of this conception, Barry
describes them in a mostly negative way, as a ‘global extension of a
principle that families with possessions to pass on have traditionally
espoused: “Keep the capital intact!”’[34]
This also means that there is no obligation for adding to the capital, unle=
ss
it is somehow deteriorated.
1.2.3 What Shall We Do with the Veil?
If we return to the concept of the original position, we find that it
was revisited by both Rawls and Barry in their later publications, in order=
to
preclude any kind of generational egoism. Barry has put forward more propos=
als
for ‘thickening’ the veil of ignorance: one of these was the sa=
me
he suggested to correspond to Rawls’ Kantian ideas, that is, to exclu=
de
from the theory the condition that persons in the original position know th=
at
they are contemporaries.[35]
This means one step further from justice as reciprocity. One more step coul=
d be
made according to his further discussion of Rawlsian notions, where he sket=
ches
the image of a contractarian Noah’s Ark: according to this version of=
the
original position, the participants do not even know whether they are going=
to
be born as humans. In that way, also the interests of animals could be drawn
into the deliberation, preventing the parties to the contract from any
‘racial egoism’.[36]
Nevertheless, Barry finally leaves the Rawlsian
framework of justice as mutual advantages for his proposal for a concept of
justice as impartiality. According to his suggestion, the description of the
original position should be completed with ‘a basic attitude of what =
you
might call human decency.’[37]
Leaving the idea of self-interest as a basis of just institutions behind, B=
arry
wants to replace the paradigm of contract with a paradigm of debate, where =
everybody=
8217;s
point of view must be taken into account. Each person in their original
position has a veto over proposed principles, which can be exercised unless=
it
would be reasonable for that person to accept a principle. To say that a
principle could not reasonably be rejected by anyone covered by it is, I
suggest, a way of saying that it meets the test of impartiality.[38]
As for the motivation that could replace the Humean ‘moderate
altruism’, Barry offers ‘the desire to act justly,’[39]
which is, he argues, a more or less generally observable phenomenon in every
human society.
Rawls, in turn, improves the veil of ignorance in =
an
indirect way. In his 1993 book, Political Liberalism, he describes w=
hat
is at stake in the original position in the following way:
The correct
principle is that which the members of any generation (and so all generatio=
ns)
would adopt as the one their generation is to follow and as the principle t=
hey
would want preceding generations to have followed...[40]
Since they do not know the place their generation is going to take in
the succession of human generations, choosing an ’egoistic’
principle of savings may strike back easily.
Both solutions seem to eliminate the reasons why t=
he
motivational assumption had to play a role in the first form of Rawls’
theory of justice. Thus, they can be taken seriously as theories of
intergenerational justice, as they help to see that present uncertainty in =
terms
of needs and values of future generations is not a theoretical obstacle for
present actions anymore, and neither is the lack of our sentiments towards
them. Still, the tension between the detached perspective of justice and the
culturally and historically situated choices people actually make remains.[41]
This is exactly the problem that H. Ph. Visser
’t Hooft addresses in his contribution to the discussion on justice to
future generations. Getting his inspiration mainly from Barry’s readi=
ng
of the Rawlsian theory, he emphasizes its forward-looking character.[42]
Visser ’t Hooft keeps on focusing on the concept of justice, and
elaborates on its temporal aspect. On the other hand, he rejects communitar=
ian
views that suggest a ‘parochial’ concept of justice (one that is
bound to particular political communities), since these are unable to suppo=
rt
an effective treatment of actual problems concerning the interests of future
generations. As he puts it,
within our
present context of discussion [i.e. that of future generations], the theory=
of
justice must resist an approach ..., which links the concept of justice to
local understandings, unless more thought is spent on the ways and means of=
an
inter-cultural meeting of minds.[43]
As a synthesis of the detached and the situated view of justice, Vis=
ser
’t Hooft proposes the image of a global community that could provide =
an
adequate framework for discussing problems of justice to future generations
that are characteristically global ones. Keeping that in mind, in the next
chapter I turn to the questions of community as they appear in the context =
of
future generations.
2 Community
As I have
mentioned in the previous chapter, the Rawlsian theory of justice is design=
ed
for a single society or political community in the most common sense of the
world. We have also seen, with Barry, that this makes the theory vulnerable=
in
several aspects. Hence Barry distinguishes three kinds of applications for
justice: justice within a society of contemporaries, international justice =
and
intergenerational justice. In my opinion, this has to direct our attention =
to
the question of communities—keeping one eye on the concept of justice=
.
Accordingly,
I am going to revisit some communitarian authors in the first part of this
chapter. Although communitarian theories have their roots in the 20th-centu=
ry
renewal of left-wing political thought, and thus date back to the fifties of
the century, our present discussion seems to demand the examination of their
criticism on some liberal notions, more particularly on the Rawlsian (or ra=
ther
Kantian) understanding of the relation between the self and the values, and=
the
idea of justice that follows from it. Then I turn to community-based theori=
es
of justice to future generations and examine if they are helpful for solving
the problems they address.
2.1 The Critics of Liberalism
The communitarians’ criticism of liberalism is focused on the
liberals’ way of conceiving of the self, i.e. of the essence of human
person. Where communitarian authors all agree, however diverging their views
are otherwise, is that they challenge the Rawlsian (or rather Kantian) noti=
on
that the self is ‘prior to the ends which are affirmed by it.’[44]
Neither can they accept its consequence, according to which the right is pr=
ior
to the good.[45]
2.1.1 The Situated Self and the Community of Justice
As M. Sandel writes in a chapter devoted to the refutation of the id=
ea
of the ‘unencumbered self’,
we cannot r=
egard
ourselves as independent in this way without great cost to those loyalties =
and
convictions whose moral force consists partly in the fact that living by th=
em
is inseparable from understanding ourselves as the particular persons we
are—as members of this family or community or nation or people, as
bearers of this history, as sons and daughters of that revolution, as citiz=
ens
of this republic.[46]
As the self is always, at least partially, determined by the communi=
ties
he is part of, also justice is always bound to a particular community.
Accordingly, M. Walzer, who devotes the most attention to theoretical quest=
ions
of justice, develops a theory according to which one can hardly conceive of=
a
generally applicable concept of justice. The explanation is rather simple:
since different communities attribute different values to the same goods,[47]
there is no common denominator for justice.[48]
Hence, the concept of justice can only be applied for relations within a
certain community (which is identified with the political community). This =
has
an important consequence for the problem of future generations. If one want=
s to
keep on making use of the notion of justice to future generations, one first
has to be sure that future persons are considered as members of the communi=
ty
of justice. Let us see, then, what Walzer has to say about that.
2.1.2 Membership
It seems to be interesting to examine here two statements of Walzer
first.[49]
The first one is the so-called ‘open-ended distributive principleR=
17;,
according to which ‘[n]o social good x should be distributed to men a=
nd
women who possess some other good y merely because they possess y and witho=
ut
regard to the meaning of x.’ (20, italics omitted) The second refers =
to
the nature of membership, and says that ‘community is itself a
good—conceivably the most important good—that gets
distributed.’ (29) Now, if we understand the latter as meaning that
membership in the community is one of the social goods, then we can substit=
ute
‘membership’ for ‘good y’, with the following resul=
t:
[n]o social=
good
x should be distributed to men and women who are members of the community of
justice merely because they are members of the community of justice and wit=
hout
regard to the meaning of x.[50]
This principle obviously contradicts to Walzer’s other stateme=
nts,
where he explicitly affirms that membership is a good prior to others. Thus,
one has to acknowledge that Walzer attributes a special status to membershi=
p,
and maintains its fundamental importance for the distribution of other goods
(of which the environment[51]
may be one). As he states elsewhere, ‘it is only as members somewhere
that men and women can hope to share in all the other social goods.’ =
(63)
Walzer apparently does not consider the question of
future generations. There is, however, a remark made by him that may be of
importance in our further inquiries. As he speaks of political communities =
as
‘historically stable, ongoing associations,’ (62) he does not
deliberate the possibility of opposing different generations to each other.
Comparing the situation of ‘strangers in political space (immigrants)=
and
descendants in time (children),’ both newcomers in the community, he
remarks that the process of admission can be controlled in both cases. For
children, however, what the political community can effectively (and
acceptably) determine is ‘the size of the population only—its
growth, stability, or decline.’ (35) Thus, the above-mentioned princi=
ple
of distribution could be reformulated for future generations as follows:
The members=
hip in
the community of justice should not be distributed to future men and women =
who
possess some other good y merely because they possess y.
And, we might add, it should not be denied from future persons merely
because they lack y. One may conclude, then, that Walzer does not deal with=
the
possibility of a moral distance between members of different generations: a
question he examines at length in terms of strangers. In my opinion, this i=
s to
be explained with some chain-like image of a ‘domestic’ continu=
ity,
similar to that of Rawls or Passmore. But in this case, again, the problem =
of
‘skips’ emerges, i.e. the possibility that later generations se=
em
too far away from a present perspective: that problem does in fact arise in=
one
of the theories examined in the following.
2.2 The Limits of Community
As it was mentioned above, the only plausible way of arguing that
justice is relevant in inter-generational relations from a communitarian
perspective is by claiming that there exists a community of justice that
comprises successive generations. The two theories that are examined in the
following both describe such a community.
2.2.1 Which Posterity Matters?
A. de-Shalit develops a theory of justice to future generations base=
d on
essentially Walzerian ideas.[52]
In his work, he examines how future generations can actually make part of a=
community
together with the present ones. He scrutinizes the question of identity in =
the
case of communities, bearing in mind the caveats of Golding. (19f)
De-Shalit does not explicitly exclude the possibil=
ity
of a chain-like continuity of a political community’s identity. He
nevertheless emphasizes that changes in commonly accepted values can lead t=
o a
downright breach between two given generations that do not have immediate l=
inks
with each other. He brings more historical examples in order to support that
view. Thus, his conception of community is limited both in space and time: =
the
members of a given community have rather limited relations to other people =
that
might be evaluated using justice as a criterion. In terms of future
generations, it means that justice is applicable only as long as the sense =
of
community exists in the members of the present generation. Shared
understandings and common values fade away with time. As for the generations
that follow after this temporal divide, the present generation only has the
same obligations as towards their own contemporaries who are outside the
community.[53] Thi=
s,
however, contradicts to his affirmation that ‘although future generat=
ions
are by definition people who will live after our deaths, our obligations to
them are a matter of justice, rather than of charity or
supererogation.’ (11)
The basic problem with this two-layered theory is =
that
however plausible it might be as a description of general political thinkin=
g,
it hardly has any theoretical potential. As a normative theory, it does not=
say
anything more than the motivational assumption as described by Rawls. Its
content might be formulated like ‘our generation has to accomplish
justice in its relationship to those generations that seem to be in the same
community, but does not have any such obligation towards those that we do n=
ot
expect to share our common understandings.’ Of course, de-Shalit seem=
s to
be right in arguing that a theory that demands too much from the present in
terms of distribution of resources may face a total rejection. (14) Still, I
think that, for the moment at least, we should put aside the question of
plausibility, and take a look at his views on community, in order to see if
they are acceptable from a purely theoretical point of view.
De-Shalit affirms that it is possible to conceive =
of a
trans-generational community, even if one excludes common life in a physical
sense.[54]
There is two more criteria that can prove the existence of such a community:
cultural interaction and moral similarity. These are strongly interconnecte=
d.
Cultural interaction means an ongoing dialogue between members of the
community. Thus, it is necessary to create new common understandings and co=
mmon
conceptions of the good life, but also to challenge and discuss old ones. In
this way, it contributes to the establishment and the continuous rethinking=
of
moral similarity, which is defined as ‘common and more or less
accepted’ ‘attitudes, values, and norms’. (28) On the oth=
er
hand, cultural interaction needs a common background, which is, at least
partially, provided by moral similarity. Now, it seems rather counterintuit=
ive
to expand the notion of cultural interaction to a trans-generational contex=
t.
On the one hand, it is clear that every generation reflects on, sometimes e=
ven
answers to ideas that stem from their predecessors, but on the other hand,
inter-generational communication works in one direction only. De-Shalit sol=
ves
this problem by emphasizing the temporality of the dialogue, and says that
‘in fact this communication will continue with the response of yet
further future generations to the future generations with whom we
communicate.’ (44) Accordingly, moral similarity is in a state of end=
less
development: attitudes, values and norms of previous generations are submit=
ted
to deliberation in every new generation. And this is exactly, de-Shalit arg=
ues,
why the sense of community ‘fades away’:
When it com=
es
about that the values of the members of the community change drastically, m=
any
members will find themselves in a state of growing alienation from the
community of their ancestors. (47)
Therefore, he concludes that the present generation may reasonably
assume that persons in some generation in the future will not consider them=
selves
as members of our community. Hence, if it comes to a conflict between needs=
of
the present generation, or of some in the proximity, and the needs of more
distant generations, priority should be given to the former.
It is also interesting to note how de-Shalit
distinguishes between an internal and an external point of view. He makes it
clear with the example of a member of the English nation. From the perspect=
ive
of a historian (an outsider), the community in both the 17th century and now
may be properly described as ‘English’, while a member of
today’s English political community (an insider) will hardly share the
values of the 17th-century English nation. (47)
While I think that the applications of
de-Shalit’s theory are acceptable at least as parts of the principles=
of
justice to future generations, his description of the community has, in my
opinion, some shortcomings.
The first problem is a practical one, and is due to
the lack of possibility of determining how fast common values are likely to
fade away. As the present generation cannot know the exact nature of future
debates, present persons cannot know where to place the divide according to
which their obligations could be determined. Hence, what remains is a pure
temporal scale, and that hardly means anything other than discounting the
future: the utilitarian solution that de-Shalit (among others) explicitly
rejects.[55]
But what seems much more puzzling to me is the
inherent contradiction in de-Shalit’s account of the cultural interac=
tion
and moral similarity. On the one hand, these factors provide for the
constitutive character of the community through the moral and political deb=
ate,
while, on the long run, it is that debate that causes common understandings=
to
disappear. But do they really disappear? It seems that de-Shalit is too
mechanical in distinguishing between the insider’s and the
outsider’s point of view, and claims that the question of shared valu=
es
should be viewed from the former one. This is justified as far as it is the
present members of the community whose decisions concerning future generati=
ons
are in the focus of the theory. Yet it is important to note that, according=
to
de-Shalit’s account, the outsider does only consider the identity of =
the
community, while insiders are concerned with the content of the
community’s tradition. De-Shalit seems to identify these two things, =
but
I think that the difference is of great importance here. The question of
recognition or self-identification is a most relevant one in terms of defin=
ing
the membership of a community. Accordingly, if one would ask the Englishman=
of
the example whether he considers himself to be part of the community referr=
ed
to as the English nation, his answer is likely to be an affirmative, as wel=
l as
that of one of his 17th-century predecessors. And, in my opinion, the same =
is
true if one would make the question refer to the membership of 17th-century=
and
present-day persons, respectively.[56]
To put it otherwise: even if we tend to assume that at some moment our
descendants are going to leave all of our values and norms, we still talk a=
bout
them (with more or less confidence) as future members of our community. In
fact, de-Shalit himself does apply a ‘mixed’ perspective in tha=
t he
speaks of the (future and objective) non-constitutiveness of a community on=
the
basis of the alleged subjective views of the community’s future membe=
rs,
and concludes to principles of justice that, again, should be adopted by the
actual community. I think, however, that also his assumption of the fading =
away
of the sense of community might face serious challenges based on the argume=
nt
of recognition. In the following, I am going to examine the views of another
communitarian author, J. O’Neill, before summarizing the points where=
the
communitarian approach may help to understand the problems of future
generations more properly, and where they need further elaboration or perha=
ps
modification.
2.2.2 Towards a Narrative Unity
O’Neill builds his theory on the notion of the
‘transgenerational self,’[57]
that also de-Shalit makes use of, but, unlike de-Shalit, he does not limit =
its
application to a psychological assumption.[58]
Contrary to the widely accepted opinion on the lack of reciprocity between
generations, O’Neill affirms that there are real harms and benefits
posterity can do to us. He begins to develop his views with a criticism of
modernity, in the spirit of Taylor and MacIntyre:
[T]he assum=
ption
that future generations cannot benefit or harm us highlights a peculiarly
modern attitude to our relation with the past and future which is at the ce=
ntre
of our environmental problems. ... It is tied to the modern loss of any sen=
se
of a community with generations outside of our own times. (27f.)
O’Neill mentions the example of narratives to demonstrate how
one’s self transcends the limits of one’s life and how future
generations can play a role ‘in determining the success or failure of=
the
work of previous generations.’ (32) As narratives about one’s w=
ork
may well exist and even change after one’s death, we can hardly speak=
of
separate generations without links to each other. Moreover, there is a wide=
group
of human projects that can be successful only in the long term: here, it is
necessary that more generations contribute to the same project, sometimes
without enjoying any of its results. These insights were generally acknowle=
dged
by every culture, until the emergence of market-based societies. The idea of
the market that emphasizes mobility against ties of place, profession and so
on, contradicts to identity across time, and that leads to a ‘temporal
myopia of modern society.’ (42)[59]
As for future generations, then, it is the
responsibility of the present generation towards its past, future, but also=
to
itself to
attempt,
as far as it is possible, to ensure that future generations do belong to a
community with ourselves—that they are capable, for example, of
appreciating works of science and art, the goods of the non-human environme=
nt,
and the worth of the embodiments of human skills, and are capable of
contributing to these goods. (34)[60]
It is important to note that O’Neill’s image of the comm= unity is a rather dynamic one, as it takes the history of a community into accoun= t. He emphasizes the importance of arguments ‘both within generations and between them.’ (36) Thus, the most important obligation of the present generation is to provide for both the external and internal conditions of t= he ongoing discussion,[61] i.e. conditions of the (physical) existence of future persons, as well as t= he (cultural) conditions of their meaningful participation in the arguments. <= o:p>
The theory of O’Neill is a very attractive o=
ne,
as it helps to overcome some problems that are often criticized in
communitarian theories. He rightly mentions debate (as opposed to a constant
set of values) as one of the most important features of a community, without
describing it as something that menaces the identity of the community, as
de-Shalit does. Furthermore, his account of communities allows for conceivi=
ng
of a global community that may be essential for dealing with global
environmental problems properly.[62]
Nevertheless, some objections can be formulated as to his arguments. The fi=
rst
possible objection concerns the influence of future generations on the succ=
ess
or failure of one’s work. This argument is put forward by O’Nei=
ll
in the context of reciprocity, as opposed to the view that future generatio=
ns
cannot help or harm presently living persons. The good of a successful life
(one that we can obtain only with the help of posterity) is then paired with
the harms present persons can do to future generations. According to
O’Neill, these are the following:
(1) We can =
fail
to produce works or perform actions which are achievements. Future generati=
ons
may not be able to bring our deeds to a successful fruition.
(2) We can =
fail
to produce generations capable of appreciating what is an achievement or
contributing to its success. (34)
Now, what I fail to see here is how these points provide for an
inter-generational reciprocity on the one hand, and mutual obligations on t=
he
other hand, since the goods of the one party that depend on the contributio=
n of
the other, are of quite different nature. But let us take a closer look on
them.
First, the possible failures of the present genera=
tion
necessarily harm further generations but also the present generation, at le=
ast
from the perspective of the present generation: indeed, it is a harm to fut=
ure
generations if they do not have anything to appreciate or contribute to, or=
if
they are unable to do so, and it is likewise a harm to us if they do not. B=
ut
these harms exist, at least partly, only from our point of view, since if
future generations cannot do something, they do not necessarily realize the=
ir
lack of that capacity. To that, O’Neill would answer that it is a mis=
take
to think that ‘what you don’t know can’t hurt you.’
(28) But it does not answer the objection that in a final analysis it is us=
who
harms us if we fail to provide for the conditions of our (future) success. =
The
next problem arises if we do our best for future generations, since
(fortunately enough) this does not compel them to render our work a success=
. Of
course, the fact that they exist and are able to appreciate or contribute to
our ongoing projects is a success in itself (one that we accomplished
ourselves!), but they will not have the slightest obligation not to let our
stories continue or end as failures.
The second objection is closely related to the fir=
st
one. With the help of his account of the trans-generational self, O’N=
eill
seeks to prove the existence of a trans-generational community, that is aim=
ed
at certain trans-generational goods. He further concludes that each generat=
ion
is responsible for contributing to maintaining the community and accomplish=
ing
its goods. As O’Neill himself states, however, there is a constant de=
bate
on many aspects of the community and its goods. There I see some tension
between this latter, discursive approach and the rather objectivist views
O’Neill develops elsewhere. He seems to be aware of the uncertainty of
particular contributions to the common goals as he formulates his principle
that ‘our primary responsibility is to attempt, as far as poss=
ible
to ensure that future generations do belong to a community with
ourselves.’ (34, emphasis added.) This seems to be a pragmatical
recognition of the fact that human action is always bound to a certain
perspective: the most one can—and has to—do is to contribute to=
the
debate (and its conditions) according to one’s best knowledge. But he=
re
again, the question of success emerges. One can never be sure if his story =
is a
success: but neither can be any of the future generations, at least not in =
an
‘objective’ sense. Of course, there are some concrete achieveme=
nts
that can be understood as fulfilling one’s ‘trans-generational
intentions.’ Still, it is nothing else but possibility what remains f=
or
those initiating trans-generational projects. This is enough for keeping the
concept of responsibility—even justice—to future generations (as
part of our community), but it also shows that uncertainty, and therefore
precaution too, also has to obtain a central place in the discussion of the
problem of future generations.
2.2.3 The Use and Abuse of Communities
To begin wi=
th
their advantages, communitarian authors seem to spend proper attention to t=
he
counterfactual nature of contractarian theories, and try to overcome that by
giving a more adequate description of real communities and the link between=
the
individual and the community. Hence, in the case of future generations, the
central issue is not how a person can be shown to be interested in the welf=
are
of future generations, but whether future persons can be thought of as maki=
ng
part of a community together with presently living people. The answers of
de-Shalit and O’Neill both start with the affirmation of a real (not
imaginary) trans-generational community that provides the framework for an
ongoing intra- and inter-generational discourse (debate) on the
community’s moral, political, and cultural understandings. Accordingl=
y,
they succeed in avoiding excessive conservatism in terms of common values,
while saving their theories from complete uncertainty. Moreover, they show =
that
the ‘object of justice’, i.e. what is distributed among generat=
ions
is not only ‘passive’ goods, but also—and mainly—the
possibility of active participation.
The
particular shortcomings of both theories are indicated above. Here, I would
like to mention only two things. First, for different reasons, both de-Shal=
it
and O’Neill fail to provide an adequate basis for the present
generation’s commitment for the interests of future generations. While
de-Shalit makes debate dissolve the sense of community on a larger time
horizon, O’Neill attempts to give more objective grounds but he cannot
reconciliate that with a necessarily present-bound perspective. Second, nei=
ther
of the authors extends the theory to a global community, which seems to be
unavoidable for mastering global problems that are characteristic for
today’s environmental concerns. Here, however, there is a greater
difference between the two. De-Shalit concentrates on a particular communit=
y,
the political one, whereas his account of the dynamics of commonly accepted
values, norms and attitudes precludes a real horizontal extension of the
community. O’Neill, in turn, develops a theory which is a much more
general one, thus it may be applied to any kind of community.
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[1=
]
The present essay was originally prepared as part of my LLM thesis at the
European Academy of Legal Theory (Brussels). I
would like to thank prof. François Ost and prof. Philippe Gér=
ard
(FUSL, Brussels), as well as Máté Paksy and Benedek Já=
vor
(PPKE, Budapest) for their valuable comments and criticism on its previous
versions.
[2] See, e.g. Rawls 1=
971,
180f and 287, Sandel (ed) 1984, 2f. On utilitarianism and its critique in
general, see Sève 1996.
[3] Cf. Wolf 2003, 28=
0f.
For one of the most elaborated libertarian theories, see Nozick 1974. A
thorough comparison (and criticism) of Rawls and Nozick is given by Sandel
1998, 66f.
[4] The theory of Raw=
ls was
formed through a series of papers published in the 50’s and 60’=
s:
they are collected in Rawls 1999. In this section, I only refer to Rawls 19=
71,
with bracketed page numbers in the text.
[5] On the veil of
ignorance in general, see Rawls 1971, 12. In the case of intergenerational
justice, see Rawls 1971, 287: ‘The parties do not know to which
generation they belong or, what comes to the same thing, the stage of
civilization of their society. They have no way of telling whether it is po=
or
or relatively wealthy, largely agricultural or already industrialized, and =
so
on. The veil of ignorance is complete in these respects.’
[6] Cf. Barry 1989, 1=
93:
‘If we adopt a less benign perspective, however, and focus not so muc=
h on
the just rate of capital accumulation as on the just rate of air and water
pollution, degradation of the landscape, depletion of natural resources,
destruction of species, creation of radiation hazards, or initiation of
potentially disastrous modifications to the world’s climate, we find =
that
the same convenient relationship no longer holds.’ In fact, Rawls does
mention the task of preservation; see, however, Hubin 1976, 78f.
[7] Cf. Hubin 1976, 7=
2, and
Visser ’t Hooft 1999, 73f.
[8] See section 1.2.1,
below.
[9] Cf. Ost 1995, 281=
. It
is interesting to note the living together of two paradigms that are descri=
bed
as ‘family’ and ‘polis’ by MacIntyre 1984, 132f, in=
the
theory of Rawls.[10]=
span> Such a suggestion=
is
made explicitly by Hubin 1976, 81f, challenging the concrete solution offer=
ed
by Rawls.
[11]=
span> This, of course, =
is not
to deny that in everyday practice care of future generations takes place mo=
st
often through care of one’s immediate descendants.
[12]=
span> Passmore 1974, 88=
f. On
Passmore’s theory, see. e.g. Ost 1995, 282f.
[13]=
span> Singer 1988, 221 =
and ibid.,
n. 7. This question leads further to the problem of over-population.=
[14]=
span> Manning 1981, 163=
.
[15]=
span> Manning 1981, 164f
(see, however, Singer 1988, 220, n. 6). The same point is made by Barry 198=
9,
194f.
[16]=
span> Visser ’t H=
ooft
1999, 75.
[17]=
span> Barry 1978, 229, =
with
reference to a review article of P. Danielson. See also Barry 1989, 179, wh=
ere
he distinguishes two Humean notions: one of the circumstances of justice and
another of justice as the subject of judgment from an impartial perspective=
.
[18]=
span> Barry 1978, 209. =
See
Rawls 1971, 126f.
=
[19]=
span> Barry 1978, 210, quoting Hume, 1948
[1751] 187.
=
[20]=
span> Cf. Singer 1988, 219.
=
[21]=
span> Cf. Barry 1978, 215.
[22]=
span> Hart 1961, 190f. =
Rawls
refers to Hart, as well: see Rawls 1971, 126, n.3.
=
[23]=
span> Barry 1978, 209.
=
[24]=
span> Cf. Barry’s remark on the op=
timism
of Rawls’ theory, quoted above, n. 15. See also Hubin 1976, 73.
=
[25]=
span> See also Hubin 1976, 79f.
=
[26]=
span> Barry 1978, 224f.
=
[27]=
span> Barry 1978, 230. To be sure, this =
is not
supported by the formulation of Rawls, who consequently speaks of
‘conditions under which human condition is both possible and neces=
sary’
(126, emphasis added) and states explicitly that ‘[u]nless these
circumstances existed there would be no occasion for the virtue of
justice’ (128).
=
[28]=
span> Barry 1978, 230.
=
[29]=
span> Barry 1978, 234.
=
[30]=
span> Barry 1978, 237.
=
[31]=
span> Barry 1978, 239 and 1989, 194f.
=
[32]=
span> Barry 1978, 238 and 1989, 195.
=
[33]=
span> Barry 1978, 242.
=
[34]=
span> Barry 1978, 243f, and 1979, 78.
=
[35]=
span> Similarly Hubin 1976, 75.
=
[36]=
span> Barry 1989, 204. See also Van de V=
eer 1979,
and Singer 1988, 221f (with further references).
=
[37]=
span> Barry 1989, 352.
=
[38]=
span> Barry 1989, 372.
=
[39]=
span> Barry 1989, 363.
=
[40]=
span> Rawls 1993, 274.
=
[41]=
span> Cf. Ricoeur 1990, 274, asking the
question ‘to what point an “ahistorical” pact may have
binding power as to a “historical” society.’
=
[42]=
span> Cf. Barry 1989, 201. Rawls’ =
theory
reflects the basic insight expressed by the often cited passage of E. Burke:
‘Society is indeed a contract... As the ends of such a partnership ca=
nnot
be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between
those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead,=
and
those who are to be born.’ (Burke 1989 [1790] 146f.) Of course, Rawls
advocates a ‘thinner’ idea of the ends of an inter-generational
partnership than Burke.
[43]=
span> Visser ’t H=
ooft
1999, 158.
=
[44]=
span> Rawls 1971, 560. Cf. Sandel 1998, =
15f
and 173f: ‘If utilitarianism fails to take seriously our distinctness,
justice as fairness fails to take seriously our commonality. In regarding t=
he
bounds of the self as prior, fixed for once and for all, it relegates our
commonality to an aspect of the good, and relegates the good to a mere
contingency, a product of indiscriminate wants and desires “not relev=
ant
from a moral standpoint”. Given a conception of the good that is
diminished in this way, the priority of right would seem an unexceptionable
claim indeed.’
=
[45]=
span> Sandel 1984, 5. See also Ricoeur 1=
990,
265f.
=
[46]=
span> Sandel 1998, 179. Cf. MacIntyre 19=
84,
220.
=
[47]=
span> Walzer 1983, 7.
=
[48]=
span> Walzer 1983, 30.
=
[49]=
span> References in the text of this poi=
nt are
to page numbers of Walzer 1983.
=
[50]=
span> That point is made by Dobson 1998,=
177f.
=
[51]=
span> Dobson 1998, 141.
=
[52]=
span> References in the text of this poi=
nt are
to page numbers of de-Shalit 1995.
[53]=
span> Cf. de-Shalit 199=
5, 17:
‘obligations to very remote future generations... do not derive from
communitarian relationships.’
=
[54]=
span> Cf. Hubin 1976, 17, who rejects the
possibility of speaking intelligibly of obligations to future
generations for that reason.
=
[55]=
span> Cf. Dobson 1998, 106f.
=
[56]=
span> The strength of identities is well
illustrated by the fact that certain communities even project their identit=
ies
back into the darkness of the past, as they search for their predecessors: =
the
19th-century collection—and creation—of folk tales and myths ab=
out
the past of newly formed nations may be a good example. See also the argume=
nt
of MacIntyre 1984, 220f.
=
[57]=
span> Cf. Dobson 1998, 105.
=
[58]=
span> O’Neill explicitly rejects
subjectivism: O’Neill 1993, 38. References in the text of this point =
are
to the page numbers of his book.
=
[59]=
span> See also O’Neill 1997, 32f. =
For
some practical (political) proposals on the basis of that view, see Achterb=
erg
1996.
=
[60]=
span> In his 1997 paper, he replaces
‘community with ourselves’ with ‘a community that has a
narrative continuity with ourselves.’ (O’Neill 1997, 32).
=
[61]=
span> Cf. MacIntyre 1984, 221f.
=
[62]=
span> O’Neill 1993, 42. Here, he q=
uotes The
Capital of K. Marx (Part 3, ch. 46): ‘[A] whole society, a nation=
, or
even all simultaneously existing societies taken together, are not the owne=
rs
of the globe. They are only its possessors, its usufructuaries, and, like <=
i>boni
patres familias, they must hand it down to succeeding generations in an
improved condition.’ (The original German text can be consulted on-li=
ne
at http://www.mlwerke.de/me.<=
/a>)
This idea is further developed by Ost 1995, and Gosseries 2004. The quotati=
on
(in a different translation) can also be found in Brown Weiss 1989, 20.
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