Cicero’s Concept of tyrannis and on the Historical Background of his orationes Caesarianae
The so-called orationes Caesarianae of Cicero (i.e. his Pro Marcello, Pro Ligario and Pro rege Deiotaro) were delivered in 46 and 45 BC and addressed to Caesar: Pro Marcello was created seemingly as a statement of the defense, actually as a political oration. Pro Ligario delivered in 46 and Pro rege Deiotaro delivered in 45 were Cicero’s only forensic speeches—although various doubts may arise in both cases, whether they could be considered real trials—after the civil war, in which praising Caesar’s clementia he seemingly legitimized his dictatura. First, we we outline the historical background of Pro Macello, after that we compare the image of Caesar outlined in Pro Marcello with the reality of politics of the period. (1) Then, we focus on the legal and historical background of Pro Ligario (2) and Pro rege Deiotaro (3) and highlight how the orator voices his conviction that he considers the dictator’s power and clementia illegitimate.
1. ON THE HISTORICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND OF PRO MARCELLO
Pro Marcello—which seems to be a statement of the defence but actually is an oratio addressed by Cicero to the dictator expressing gratefulness over the pardon granted by Caesar to Marcus Claudius Marcellus—was delivered by Cicero most probably in September 46, i.e. before the Ludi Caesaris, in the senate, breaking his silence after a long while. After the series of festivities arranged in honour of Caesar the relation between them significantly deteriorated, so it is hard to imagine that the orator praised the dictator in Pro Marcello. After the victory at Thapsus on 6 April 46 the senate showered Caesar, who came home on 25 July from his campaign in Africa, with several honours—a fourteen day festivity, seventy-two lictores ordered to the triumphus, censor’s and praefectus morum’s office for three years and erecting a statue representing half-gods attributes, including the dictator’s power voted for ten years. The weeks following homecoming were spent with preparing the series of festivities, and by Caesar working out an overall reform package, among others, on settling the veterans. The dictator resolutely stood up for his peace politics and made efforts to win over his former enemies, including Cicero, as after Pharsalus he granted most of his enemies pardon, and assigned prioritised tasks to some of them—Ser. Sulpicius Rufus, M. Iunius Brutus, Dolabella and C. Cassius Longinus. Based thereon in his letters Cicero could report good news to his friends still in exile, so for example, to Ligarius, Trebianus and Nigidius Figulus. At this time Cicero could feel safe in Rome as he received proper security from Caesar and owing to the good offices of his friends A. Hirtius and L. Cornelius Balbus who were given positions in the new administration and C. Cassius Longinus, M. Iunius Brutus and P. Cornelius Dolabella who received pardon. At the request of and addressed to Brutus he wrote the work on the history of rhetoric named after the addressee (entitled Brutus) and he began Cato maior de senectute. Cassius, Dolabella and Hirtius stayed long at their master’s villa in Tusculum, who sent them to Caesar: in his letters addressed to his friends he notes that his influence in Rome has significantly decreased, he follows Epikuros not liked by him, he waives to produce effect on Caesar’s administration, and he desires to live solely for his theoretical work. These works, as a matter of fact, were aimed at praising and restoring the state of form of the republic. It was in this political environment that amnesty was given to the former consul, M. Claudius Marcellus, the only one of Caesar’s enemies having stayed alive, whom Caesar’s most resolute opponent, Brutus himself acknowledged as early as in his work entitled De virtute published in the beginning of 46. Being one of the consuls of the year 51, Marcus Claudius Marcellus as the colleague of the famous jurist, Servius Sulpicius Rufus made efforts in vain to order Caesar back from his governor’s office in Gallia, tried to prevent Caesar from applying for consulatus while being absent and made several attempts at formal accusation against Caesar. At the same time, in 49, quite wisely, referring to lack of proper preparedness he took a position against starting civil war. Having retired to Mytilene on Lesbos after Caesar’s victory at Pharsalus, he devoted his life to intellectual activity, yet, he was not willing to ask for mercy from the dictator. In his letters written in August 46 Cicero tried to convince him stating that by refusing Caesar’s pardon he endangers both his property and life.
To Cicero, the prime fighter for the rights of the senate, Marcellus was equal to the values and traditions of the old res publica, and if he accepts the pardon granted by Caesar, this might bring along two things for Cicero. On the one hand, this fact might legitimise reconciliation between Caesar and Cicero after the battle at Pharsalus, which was considered treason by many adherents of Pompeius, on the other hand, the more influential adherents of the order of the republic returned to Rome, the greater chances there were for restoring the former order of the state. Before Marcellus himself had taken any steps, his case was discussed at a session of the senate where—on the initiative of Cicero’s father-in-law, L. Piso—the body took the position almost unanimously to grant pardon. To the question whether the initiation arose from spontaneous motivation or it should be considered the play of Caesar’s propaganda—as it is presumed by Kumaniecki, Grimal and Kahn—it is hard to give a clear answer. At this session, which gave Cicero hope that the senate could regain its old authority, and provided slight confidence that Caesar might be also willing to restore res publica—which confidence is reflected in his letter to Sulpicius Rufus too—he broke his voluntary silence by expressing his thanks to Caesar. To his friend he emphasised that the revival of res publica called for his studia and Caesar’s voluntas. In his letter to Paetus he justified both his silence and expression of opinion by stating that it was a wise man’s trait to do nothing hurried by which he could incur the hatred of the possessors of potentia. At the same time, Cicero was tormented by inner doubts whether by waiving his silence he had lost honestum otium that enabled him to refrain from taking a position regarding public affairs and devote his life fully to his philosophical works, reflecting on conditions of current political affairs and formulating criticism against Caesar, which in 46 produced Brutus and Paradoxa Stoicorum as well as some parts of De legibus, Cato maior de senectute and Orator. Marcellus could not enjoy the benefits of Caesar’s pardon: on the way home on 27 May 45 his friend, P. Magius Cilo murdered him, and Cicero shared the view that Caesar was not responsible for this murder. Pro Marcello was published in May 45, nine months after it was delivered as Caesar could read it in Hispania. Based on this, we can presume that Cicero re-edited the delivered oration at some points and voiced his feelings entertained after September 46.
2. THE HISTORICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND OF PRO LIGARIO
Quintus Ligarius—who was born as the offspring of an insignificant Sabine gens, his brother, Titus fulfilled the office of quaestor urnabus around 54, his other brother, Quintus obtained quaestura sometimes in the 50’s—filled the office of legatus in 50 beside Considius Longus propraetor in the Africa province. After Considius went to Rome at the end of 50 to run as candidate for consulatus, the administration of the province was left to Ligarius, who—as Cicero asserts—was not pleased to undertake it. Immediately before the outbreak of the civil war, in 49 the senate appointed Q. Aelius Tubero, Cicero’s remote relative, propraetor of Africa, who waited before taking over the province—we do not know whether his illness prevented him from travelling or he wanted to wait and see what direction high politics would take. In Africa Ligarius also took a wait-and-see attitude. That is how it happened that not long after the outbreak of the civil war—after the defeat by Caesar at Auximum—before the propraetor designated by the senate, P. Attius Varus, Pompeius’s adherent, Africa’s one-time governor arrived in Utica, who arbitrarily took over the governance of the province on behalf of the republican side and ordered to set up two legions. Ligarius was compelled to subordinate himself to Varus’s supremacy; however, both Cicero and Caesar disputed its validity as Varus’s procedure lacked lawful grounds.
Soon, in the spring of 49—the exact date is not known, it might have taken place after Cato’s withdrawal from Sicily, i.e., 23 April—Africa’s legitimate governor, Q. Aelius Tubero, together with his son appeared at Utica. Tubero was prohibited by Varus and Ligarius, exercising administration along the coast of Africa, to land and take over the province assigned to him by the senate as well as to take water and get his ill son to enter the province. In the plea of defence Cicero shifted the responsibility for the above onto Varus. Regarding these events Caesar did not mention Ligarius’s name either, only Varus’s. The exact cause of the hostile conduct engaged by Varus and Ligarius are not known, their distrust was most probably due to the fact that Tubero kept delaying his journey to Africa and they suspected him of belonging to Caesar’s adherents. After that, Tubero joined Pompeius in Greece, and took part in the battle at Pharsalus on his side; then, we was granted pardon by Caesar. In the meantime, Caesar’s commander, Curio commanded troops to Africa in August 49, and after the victories over Varus and Ligarius he died in the battle against the ruler of Numida, Iuba. Only a few of Curio’s army, including Asinius Pollio, were able to escape to Sicily. Iuba considered himself absolute winner and had a part of the Roman soldiers who surrendered to Varus executed. Although Varus did not approve this step, he was not in the situation to oppose it. As Iuba appeared to be the republican forces’ most significant support in Africa, the pro-Pompeius senate awarded him the title of king and hospitality, while the pro-Caesar senate declared him enemy (hostis populi Romani). After the battle at Pharsalus Pompeius’s adherents gathered in Africa to continue the fight against Caesar; the office of the commander-in-chief was given on the grounds of Cato’s decision to Pompeius’s father-in-law, the consul of the year 52, Q. Metellus Scipio. Attius Varus, Labienus and Cato submitted themselves to Metellus Scipio, however, internal hostility mostly worn out the force of opposition and, to a considerable extent, facilitated Caesar’s victory in Africa in 46. Cato proudly took his own life and deprived Caesar from the opportunity of exercising power—punishment or pardon—over him, Attius Varus and Labienus moved to Hispania, and continued the fight there up to 45.
After the battle at Thapsus Ligarius was taken as captive in Hadrimentum, however, Caesar gave him pardon just as to Considius’s son. From the fact of captivity in Hadrimentum it is possible to draw the conclusion that Ligarius stayed there during the entire term of the war in Africa and did not assume any part in war actions; yet, he could not have been a really significant person since the author of Bellum Africanum does not mention him by name. Caesar’s pardon was not rare at all as the dictator gave amnesty to everybody who surrendered without fight in the war in Africa; only a few even of the chiefs were killed, e.g. Afranius and Faustus Sulla captivated during fight—whether it was done on the direct orders of Caesar or without his knowledge is disputed. This is fully supported by Cicero’s statement when he speaks about a victory where only armed persons were killed. However, a granted pardon did not give permit to return to Italy.
Ligarius’s relatives turned to Cicero as early as in the summer of 46 asking him to use his influence with Caesar to allow Ligarius to return to Italy, and in letters with highly official tone dated in August and September 46 respectively—which does not certify that they maintained any friendly relation—the orator assured Ligarius of his help. It is not known what kind of relationship Cicero maintained with the otherwise not too significant Ligarii known only for their hostile emotions towards Caesar and what role Cicero’s ceaseless financial difficulties played in undertaking the case. It is possible that it was Brutus’s mediation that made Cicero undertake the case. On the other hand, for a long while Cicero did not have any direct contact with the dictator, only with his environment, e.g., with Pansa, Hirtius and Postumus. In Ligarius’s matter, together with Ligarius’s brothers he made efforts to get close to Caesar through mediators and disclose the matter to him. This was not an easy task because, among others, Caesar took a dislike to those who were involved in the war in Africa and wanted to keep them in uncertainty by delaying their return; Cicero encouraged Ligarius by asserting that his troubles would be soon solved for Caesar’s anger lessened from day to day. His next letter more resolutely voiced the hope in the opportunity of returning home soon as having undertaken the somewhat humiliating situation to ask for audience as a senator consularis from Caesar four years younger than him, not being above him at all in the hierarchy of the Republic, Cicero was granted personal hearing by Caesar where he appeared together with Ligarius’s brothers, who threw themselves to the ground at the dictator’s feet, and Cicero delivered a speech. To all that Caesar responded generously, which made giving amnesty unquestionable in Cicero’s eyes, however, it could not be considered a completed fact. So, Ligarius’s case was in a fair way to get solved to satisfy everybody when in the last days of September 46 the son of Lucius Tubero, the former governor, Q. Aelius Tubero brought a charge against Ligarius, which he wanted to support primarily by asserting that Ligarius—and Varus—had not let him land in Africa, in the province assigned to them by the senate. Perhaps the charges included the relation maintained with Iuba as enemy and high treason implemented thereby. At the same time, it should be mentioned at the outset that in Pro Ligario delivered in October on the Forum Cicero did not touch on the legally relevant charges, however, by his speech—his oratio made before the general public for the first time in the period following the civil war—he seemingly legitimised Caesar’s dictatura.
The defence was provided by C. Vibius Pansa, one of Caesar’s closest men—governor of Bithynia and Pontus in 47 and 46, governor of Gallia Cisalpina in 45, then, on Caesar’s proposal, consul designatus of the year 43, together with A. Hirtius—and by Cicero. Regarding the progress of the case it is worth reading Plutarch’s account. Thus, Plutarch presumed that the outcome of the proceedings had been determined right from the outset, namely, it was a decided fact for Caesar that Ligarius was guilty and would be convicted and it was only the power of Cicero’s eloquence that turned the flow of events. Caesar’s pardon produced its effect: in March 44 Ligarius was one of Caesar’s assassins, then he and his family became the victim of the proscriptiones ordered by Antonius and Octavianus. It is a fact that Caesar pardoned Ligarius and let him return to Italy, however, the following doubts arise with regard to Plutarch’s version. If Caesar—as Cicero’s letter asserts—did not entertain hostile emotions against Ligarius, why did he allow the proceedings to take place? There might have been two reasons for that: he either wanted to inflict punishment on Tubero or wanted to provide powerful propaganda for his own clementia by forgiveness. The intention to convict Ligarius is highly improbable since Cicero did not put forward any new charges that would not have been known to him at the time of writing his letter dated late November, describing Caesar’s intentions. Furthermore, Pansa, being the dictator’s confidant, would not have undertaken the defence of Ligarius, if it had been decided from the outset that he was guilty, and Caesar would not have assigned defence to Pansa, if he had not wanted to give pardon to Ligarius. Caesar was very much aware that Ligarius did not have great influence among Pompeius’s adherents and that the events in Africa were controlled by Varus, Cato, Matellus and Labienus. By that Caesar wanted to send a message to Attius Varus and Labienus fighting in Hispania: they had not lost all of their chances for settling the conflict with as little blood sacrifice as possible.
It seems to be more probable that Caesar decided to acquit Ligarius in order to prove his by then proverbial generosity again. Yet, it was just the appearance of this intention that had to be avoided by all means: as Caesar had no other purpose by the proceedings than have his clementia celebrated through acquitting Ligarius, for this reason, he put on the mask of the angry judge having been already convinced of Ligarius’s depravity who could be moved by Cicero’s eloquence only. Caesar as a master of political propaganda must have gladly grasped the opportunity offered for playing the role that his clementia was brought to the surface and shaped Ligarius’s fate favourably owing to the efficient oration of the counsel for the defence only. It cannot be ruled out that for Caesar—using Cicero’s role taking for his own goals—the Ligarius case might have also served to enable him to convince those of his adherents who considered the scope of pardon granted by him excessive that both his more moderate and forgiving adherents and his defeated opponents agreed with the main line of his politics.
Regarding this view Drumann does not qualify Cicero’s role specifically, yet, knowing his damning judgement on the orator-statesman he could not have formed a positive picture of it since elsewhere—very much in bad faith—he presents Cicero as an extremely vain figure who overestimates himself, is heated by the desire to be in the public eye, lacks clear political vision, and overtly humbles to potentes. The question can be estimated with greater subtlety from the works of Gelzer and Klass if we presume that Cicero, using Caesar’s propaganda, tried to realise his own program: the more supporters of Pompeius were granted pardon, the more chances he could see for strengthening the situation of the optimates, which in the long run could make (could have made) it possible to restore the order of the state of the Republic. To this end, it was indispensable to force Caesar somehow to implement his announced fundamental principles. Handling the situation required great sense of tactics, seeming subordination, internal resoluteness and external flexibility from Cicero. Caesar’s later acts, the battle at Munda and Ides of March 44 proved that both Cicero and Caesar had wrongly surveyed the efforts of the other party and the political party. The clementia showed towards Ligarius was addressed not only to Pompeius’s adherents fighting against Caesar in Africa but also to those preparing for another war in Hispania, and Cicero’s participation in the proceedings provided sufficient publicity for the case as well as the appearance of objectivity manifested by Caesar. At the same time, Pro Ligario made it possible for Cicero—although it might have seemed to be shameless flattery in the eye of the adherents of the Republic—to enforce his own political goals, i.e., to try to make the dictator committed to follow his conciliatory policy, and to find as many causes for exculpation for the supporters of Pompeius as possible. Cicero, however, presumably—contrary to Walser’s view, who interprets the Ligarius case as demonstration of Cicero’s vanity and overestimation of his own role—took part in the play directed by Caesar not because he was driven by political blindness and hybris, as it were believing that by his orator’s ingenuity he could deceit and enchant the dictator’s clear political vision. Much rather his concerns formulated in the letter written to Servius Sulpicius Rufus were realised: again he was compelled to take a position and as it were became extortable—if we take his promises made to his friends who lost favour, e.g., Ligarius seriously. On the other hand, if he did not want to get again into open hostility with Caesar, he could not refuse to legitimise his peace policy by taking position, which policy most probably had some attraction for Cicero too since it was the only thing that could bring some kind of remedy for the empire having been exhausted in the civil war. Cicero was also as much of a political realist to size up that it was impossible to avoid public life turning into sheer anarchy without some kind of compromise between the parties. Yet, he did not let Caesar use his talent as unprincipled tool: in Pro Ligario he ceaselessly makes an effort to certify excusable errors of Pompeius’s adherents and does not omit to criticise the dictator’s status and the general conditions of Rome.
Regarding the procedure followed by Caesar, there are certain similarities with his conduct engaged when granting pardon to Marcellus. Caesar himself was also interested in calling Marcellus back from exile; on the one hand, he wanted to demonstrate his generosity again; and, on the other hand, he wanted to advance legitimisation of dictatorship by the fact that a firm adherent of the republic such as Marcellus also returned home and acquiesced in the changes in political conditions, and by accepting the pardon granted to him as it were acknowledged it. In spite of the fact that Marcellus’s homecoming was a previously resolved fact, the dictator’s propaganda was meant to create the impression that Caesar bowed to the senate’s request only when he called the republican Marcellus back from exile. Caesar’s father-in-law, Piso mentioned Marcellus’s name seemingly accidentally in his speech delivered in the senate, upon which Marcellus’s cousin with identical name threw himself on the ground at Caesar’s feet to beg for pardon for his kin, then the senators also rose from their seat and asked Caesar to exercise mercy. The dictator, after having complained at length about Marcellus’s faults, seemingly utterly unexpectedly declared that he would not be averse to the wish of the senate. This was followed by noisy applause of the senate and Cicero’s speech, in which Cicero praised his human eminence. Presumably, a similar choreography can be observed in Ligarius’s case too. If Caesar had let Ligarius return home without special proceedings, he would have missed an important occasion to propagate his policy advocating conciliation. As a matter of fact, it is not possible to give an answer to the question whether Tubero had acted against Ligarius upon Caesar’s instruction or the dictator merely made use of the occasion being offered.
3. THE HISTRORICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND OF PRO REGE DEIOTARO
Deiotarus’s situation vis-á-vis Caesar became rather unpleasant after the battle at Pharsalus, which the prosecutors did not omit to exploit for their own benefit, because in 48 he visited Pompeius in his camp. Caesar, who had the integrity of Deiotarus’s royal title and empire enforced in the senate as consul, interpreted this gesture as an act of ungratefulness. Although in 47 Deiotarus asked for the opportunity to meet Caesar to exculpate himself for his conduct that Caesar found injurious, Caesar refused the favour of a meeting, bringing it to the king’s knowledge that in 48 already he was the repository of legitimacy, therefore, purely on the grounds of Roman public law Deiotarus would have been obliged to be loyal to him. After Pharsalus, Deiotarus sided with Caesar and supported his campaign in Alexandria, yet, Caesar decided that although Deiotarus could retain his royal dignity, he should give up a significant part of his empire. This dismemberment, which took place after the battle at Zela in Nikaia, meant the following: a part of Deiotarus’s empire in Armenia was granted to Arzobarzanes, ruler of Cappadocia, and a Galatian territory was allocated to Mithridates, ruler of Pergamum. For a while Deiotarus hoped for the victory of Pompeius’s adherents in Africa, however, after their defeat he definitely distanced himself from them. After Mithridates’s death not much later, Deiotarus attempted to get Caesar to return him the rule over the Galatian tetrarchia, which, however, Castor Saocondarus, tetrarcha and Deiotarus’s son-in-law wanted to prevent by all means.
After the battle at Munda that took place in March 45, Caesar received Deiotarus’s delegation in Taracco, and in a letter addressed to the king he held out the prospect of adjudging the case favourably. Anticipating the adoption of this decision, Castor Saocondarus’s son, Castor, Deiotarus’s grandson brought a double charge against his grandfather, founding it on the testimony of the escaped slave, Phidippus, the king’s former physician, claiming that he had prepared assassination attempt against Caesar—on the occasion of the visit he paid to Galatia in 47—and together with C. Caesilius Bassus he secretly plotted against Caesar. The prosecutors most probably founded their claim on Caesar’s aversion to and bias against Deiotarus. By this turn the case constructed an until then unprecedented political and legal situation, namely, prior to that it had never occurred that a rex iussus was summoned before a Roman court for being charged with capital offence, to say nothing of the fact that no foedus iniquum whatsoever entered into with Deiotarus submitted the king to the jurisdiction of Rome. The charge against Deiotarus was based on the testimony of his slave, Pheidippos, which, in addition to being morally displeasing, created an impossible legal situation since in Rome a slave was not allowed to testify against his master in a criminal action. Furthermore, it added to these awkwardnesses that in those days Deiotarus did not stay in Rome, and in accordance with the order of Roman criminal procedure no proceedings could be conducted against the accused in his absence. The case was made more delicate by the fact that the charge due to the assassination planned and attempted against Caesar was brought before the dictator himself, who in accordance with the principle ”nemo iudex in propria causa” would have by no means had the right to act as judge in the proceedings—not even in the case if he had been just as Sulla entitled to the title of dictator rei publicae constituendae (legibus scribundis), which in theory vested him with unrestricted punitive power. Yet, easily rising above all these reservations Caesar himself desired to proceed in king Deiotarus’s case as a judge.
Cicero, as a matter of fact, did not omit to bring up these awkwardnesses, but being compelled to present these legal abuses as Caesar’s merits, he made capital of this need, declaring that the dictator would guarantee that he should not be afraid of any inequity in the case. Cicero’s words also reveal that Caesar did not take the principle of passing judgment in consilium into account either, and the orator, while emphasising the dictator’s clementia, was compelled to make the absurd charges inauthentic by weighty counter-arguments. Although the biography written by Suetonius on Caesar asserts that in his administration of justice he proceeded very strictly and justly, we can by no means take this statement to refer to Deiotarus’s case, at most to the judgments passed by Caesar during the term of his proconsulatus, on the one hand, and to those passed in the disputes arising from the ager publicus allocated to his veterans after the civil war, on the other. Consequently, the proceedings against king Deiotarus can be in no circumstances considered a criminal action; on the contrary, it provides a glaring example of Caesar’s arrogance disregarding law and order of the Republic and defiantly showing off his personal power. The outcome of the lawsuit is not known, Caesar presumably adjourned decision. There are good chances of excluding the opportunity of acquittal since later Cicero noted that Caesar adjudged no issue whatsoever regarding Deiotarus justly. Nor can it be ascertained that Deiotarus was sentenced as Cicero would have probably used the fact of death sentence as an argument against Antonius, who wanted to have a law from Caesar’s purported legacy, which could be reinstated to Deiotarus’s earlier reign, adopted as authentic. Irrespective of the result of the lawsuit, immediately after Caesar’s death, Deiotarus took possession of the territories that the dictator had disannexed from him, and this annexation was acknowledged as lawful by a regulation made public by Antonius—presumably in return for significant valuable consideration.
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 Dio Cass. 43, 14. 3–7; 43, 19, 3. On some aspects of the orationes Caesarianae see NÓTÁRI, T. Tényálláskezelés, p. 171ff.; NÓTÁRI, T. Staatsdenken, passim; MCDERMOTT, W. C. In Ligarianam, p. 317; SCHMIDT, O. E. Der Briefwechsel, p. 252ff; ROCHLITZ, S. Das Bild Caesars, p. 74; MEYER, E. Caesars Monarchie, p. 384; GELZER, M. Caesar, der Politiker, p. 257.
 Dio Cass. 43, 25f; Suet. Caes. 40–44. Cf. GELZER, M. Caesar, der Politiker, p. 261ff; MEYER, E. Caesars Monarchie, p. 410ff.
 Dio Cass. 41, 62f; 42, 13. 32f.; ROCHLITZ, S. Das Bild Caesars, p. 745.
 Cic. fam. 6, 13, 2; 6, 10; 4, 13.
 DYER, R. R. Rhetoric and Intention, p. 17ff.
 Cic. fam. 9, 18, 1; 6, 12, 1f.; 7, 28, 2; 9, 20, 1; Brut. 21f.; 328ff. Cf. DYER, R. R. Rhetoric and Intention, p. 17.
 Cic. Phil. 13, 29; GELZER, M. Caesar, der Politiker, p. 278ff.; MEYER, E. Caesars Monarchie, p. 383.
 Cic. Att. 5, 2, 3; fam. 12, 15, 2; Sall. hist. 1, 9; Dio Cass. 40, 59; Plut. Caes. 29; Suet. Caes. 28.
 Caes. civ. 1, 2; Cic. fam. 4, 7, 2; 4, 11, 2; Brut. 249f.
 Cic. fam. 4, 7. 8. 9.
 Cic. Marc. 3. 13; fam. 4, 8, 2; 4, 9, 1. 3; 6, 6, 11; 7, 3, 6; BÜCHNER, K. Cicero, p. 353; GELZER, M. Caesar, der Politiker, p. 278; SEEL, O. Ciero, p. 338ff.; ROCHLITZ, S. Das Bild Caesars, p. 77.
 Cic. Marc. 3. 13. 33; fam. 4, 4, 3.
 KUMANIECKI, K. Der Prozeß, p. 440f.; GRIMAL, P. Cicero, p. 425; KAHN, A. D. The Education, p. 408f.; ROCHLITZ, S. Das Bild Caesars, p. 78.
 Cic. fam. 4, 4, 3f.; 4, 9, 2; Cic. Marc. 2; MEYER, E. Caesars Monarchie, p. 406f.; GELZER, M. Caesar, der Politiker, p. 293; DYER, R. R. Rhetoric and Intention, p. 19.
 Cic. fam. 9, 16, 5.
 Cic. Att. 13, 10, 3; fam. 4, 9, 2; 4, 12.
 Cic. Att. 13, 12, 2; DYER, R. R. Rhetoric and Intention, p. 19.
 BROUGHTON, T. R. S. The Magistrates, II. p. 223., p. 581; III. p. 35.
 Cic. Lig. 3; Caes. civ. 1, 31, 2. Cf. WALSER, G. Der Prozeß, p. 90.
 Cic. Lig. 22. 27; Caes. civ. 1, 31, 3.
 WALSER, G. Der Prozeß, p. 91; MCDERMOTT, W. C. In Ligarianam, p. 321.
 Caes. civ. 2, 44.
 WALSER, G. Der Prozeß, p. 91; MCDERMOTT, W. C. In Ligarianam, p. 321f.
 Bell. Afr. 89.
 Dio Cass. 43, 12, 3; Bell. Afr. 95. Cf. Cic. Lig. 19.
 Cic. fam. 6, 13, 1., 6, 14, 1. Cf. MCDERMOTT, W. C. In Ligarianam, p. 322.
 MCDERMOTT, W. C. In Ligarianam, p. 323.
 Cic. fam. 7, 7, 6; 6, 12, 2.
 Cic. fam. 6, 13, 3f.
 Cic. fam. 6, 14, 2; MCDERMOTT, W. C. In Ligarianam, p. 323.
 WALSER, G. Der Prozeß, p. 90f. About Ael. Tubero see KUNKEL, W. Herkunft, p. 37.
 Plut. Cic. 39, 5–6.
 Plut. Brut. 11. Cf. WALSER, G. Der Prozeß, p. 93; KUMANIECKI, K. Der Prozeß, p. 440ff.; LOUTSCH, C. Ironie et Liberté, p. 98ff.; CRAIG, C. P. The Central Argument, p. 193ff.
 Cic. fam. 6, 14.
 ROCHLITZ, S. Das Bild Caesars, p. 118; WALSER, G. Der Prozeß, p. 95.
 KUMANIECKI, K. Der Prozeß, p. 439ff.
 MCDERMOTT, W. C. In Ligarianam, p. 327; DRUMANN, W.–GROEBE, W. K. A. Geschichte Roms, III. p. 636ff.; VI. p. 232ff.; ROCHLITZ, S. Das Bild Caesars, p. 119.
 DRUMANN, W.–GROEBE, W. K. A. Geschichte Roms, III. p. 63.
 KLASS, J. Cicero und Caesar, p. 188f.
 WALSER, G. Der Prozeß, p. 96; MCDERMOTT, W. C. In Ligarianam, p. 325.
 Cic. Att. 13, 20, 4. Cf. KUMANIECKI, K. Der Prozeß, p. 453; FUHRMANN, M.: Cicero und die römische Republik. München, 19913. 34.
 Cf. Cic. fam. 4, 4, 4; 6, 13. 14; Att. 13, 20, 4; WALSER, G. Der Prozeß, p. 96; ROCHLITZ, S. Das Bild Caesars, p. 119.
 DRUMANN–GROEBE: op. cit. III. 637; KUMANIECKI, K. Der Prozeß, p. 457.
 ROCHLITZ, S. Das Bild Caesars, p. 120.
 Bell. Alex. 34. 39f.; 67–70; Cic. Deiot. 8. 22. 35ff.; div. 1, 27; 2, 29; Phil. 2. 94; Bell. Alex. 78, 3; Dio Cass. 41, 63, 3. Cf. BRINGMANN, K. Der Diktator, p. 81; RITTER, H. Caesars Verfügung. p. 124ff.
 On the status of the dinasties in Asia minor see HOBEN, W. Untersuchungen, passim
 Cic. Deiot. 25. Cf. RITTER, H. Caesars Verfügung, p. 124ff.
 Cic. Deiot. 38. Cf. BRINGMANN, K. Der Diktator, p. 82.
 Cic. Deiot. 8f.; Phil. 2, 94f.
 On the international relations of Republican Rome see FÖLDI A.–HAMZA G. A római jog, p. 64f.
 On this princilpe see MOLNÁR I. Büntető- és büntetőeljárásjogi, p. 167ff.
 Cf. C. 3, 5.
 Cf. MOMMSEN, TH. Römisches Strafrecht, p. 35ff.; KUNKEL, W. Untersuchungen, p. 21ff.
 See GOTOFF, H. C. p. 15ff.; Cic. Deiot. 4.
 Cic. Deiot. 15ff. About the different functions of consilium see KUNKEL, W. Die Funktion, p. 151ff.
 Suet. Caes. 43, 1; Val. Max. 6, 2, 11; BRINGMANN, K. Der Diktator, p. 85.
 Cic. Att. 14, 12, 1.
 Cic. Phil. 2, 95.
 Cic. Phil. 2, 93–96; OLSHAUSEN, E. Die Zielsetzung, p. 12340.
 Cic. Att. 14, 12, 1; Phil. 2, 93ff.; ROCHLITZ, S. Das Bild Caesars, p. 130f.