Péter Szaniszlai

Rethinking the connection of “market” and “community” in contemporary

Japan - Deregulation, Suburbs, and Shopping Malls






1. Preface and problem consciousness


 This paper is an introduction to, and a reflection on the research of Professor Taniguchi Koichi[1], thus, it can be regarded as a meta-analysis. It is based on the examination of the combined effect of urbanization, and deregulation policy in contemporary Japan. The starting problem which the article deals with is the correlation between the ageing of population, abolishment of economic control, deregulation of urban planning rules and change in urban structures. The combined effect of these caused the decline of local community in Japanese rural areas. On the one hand, the significance of this problem for an international audience lies in its being an example for how deregulation (or indirectly, globalization) can deeply affect a society, even one of the most developed countries.


 On the other hand, the real topic of the article is this phenomenon’s significance for the field of legal and political philosophy, as it poses the following question: is it possible to create a (political) community of common values in a social framework which is not regulated, or it is required to be regulated only by “free market”? Or, in a more theoretical level: is it possible for human beings to reach a place called “home”[2]? The actual crisis of urbanization and regulation gives us an opportunity to reconsider these questions. Thus, most of this paper will deal with these “normative dimensions”. The basic problem of urbanization-deregulation will be regarded as already proved, and the way of questioning is “if we consider that this is the situation, what is its significance for legal philosophy?” Even if this is the main problem, as the basic situation is not very well-known especially for an international audience, description of suburbs-deregulation-shopping malls connection will take many pages – especially as first Taniguchi also illustrates the situation of suburbs in details[3].



2. (Sub)-urbanization and community in post-war Japan


 First, the particularities of urbanization in Japan[4] will be introduced.

 One important feature of the contemporary Japanese society is the high rate of urbanized population. Before Second World War, the proportion of rural population was around 30% and countryside population 70%. In the second half in the 20th century with a – both qualitatively and quantitatively – rapid urbanization movement, this situation turned into the opposite. Also, because of geographical reasons, recently (data from 2000) 65.2% of the population lives in the 3.3% of the state’s territory[5]. This shows the importance of urban space in the country.


 Urbanization has its common features everywhere in the world, and Japan was basically not an exemption. However, there are some peculiar motifs in Japanese urbanization process and urban structures which can not be seen in other societies. That is the linkage with countryside before the war; the high level of community activity even in urbanized areas; and the development which led to the establishment of “Japanese-style suburbs” called new towns[6]. For this study, the most important from these features is the second one, so while the others would be only explained briefly, that one would be introduced in details.


 Before the war, urban society still had strong ties with the countryside. Most urban residents returned to their region of origin, after they were not able to work in cities anymore. Families were usually left in villages[7]. This can be interpreted as link to the rural community in times when urbanization was not so extreme. Later this feature was lost as a result of the sequels in the 1960’s, when a huge crowd of migrants streamed into cities, stable factories and working facilities were built, first in the former city centers, then even in surrounding suburbs. As a factor giving the greatest effect on city structures is motorization and building of railway networks, which was an impetus for the development of suburban areas. Railway lines were extremely important. In the case of districts with large-scale planned population, even new stations were opened. Even nowadays, commuting to the downtown mostly conducted by railways or subways, not automobiles. This also causes problems like in rush hours these facilities become overcrowded, especially in the case of commuting to distant outskirt districts.


 Japanese suburbs are account on development among railway tracks. Also, “sub-downtowns” arose in the terminals of railways, just as housing estates, which will be explained later in details. New town phenomenon in Japan is also connected to suburbs; in fact, new towns can be mostly identified as suburbs. For the time being, suburbs are the largest urban spaces in Japan[8].


2.1 Features of new towns and suburbs in Japan

 According to a general definition, a new town is a specific type of a planned community, or planned city that was carefully planned from its inception and is typically constructed in a previously undeveloped area. This contrasts with settlements that evolve in a more ad hoc fashion. Land use conflicts are uncommon in new towns. However, in the case of Japan, most “suburbs” outside cities (downtowns) are generally called “new town”, using the meaning of “newly established town”. In this sense, American suburbs can be identified with Japanese new towns[9]. This means that new towns or suburbs mostly consists housing estates in these areas. After the war, population was concentrated in metropolises. At this time, sequential cultivation of metropolis suburbs began. Economic growth was a rapid expansion of urban zones into the surrounding areas.

 This movement had effect from the US and UK, but different from the British autonomous “new towns”, their features are usually closer to “bed-towns”. Besides, their aim is also “to form an environment favorable for nuclear family and thus raising children”. New Towns here are more like dormitory suburbs than self-contained entities, but originally their built-up area usually developed in a neat and orderly fashion.


 Around 30 new towns have been built in all over the country. Most of these constructions were initiated during the period of rapid economic growth in the 1960s, but construction continued into the 1980s. Most of them are located near Tokyo and the Kansai region.

 This is because in the age of rapid economic growth, when urbanization also got an utmost speed, several facilities were needed for the migrants from the countryside. As land prices were extremely high in former city centers and the formerly existed territory of cities, large-scale living estates (danchi) were needed. Citizens who moved there mostly had their workplace in the downtown or in the former city area, so as in the case of suburbs in general, living estates provided housing mostly for commuters. Around these estates, several locally owned shops and communal facilities were established.


 Some towns (for example Tama New Town) do not provide much employment, and many of the residents commute to the nearby city. These towns fostered the infamous congestion of commuter trains (although as the metropolitan areas have grown, this commute has become relatively short in comparison to commutes from the new urban fringe). Other New Towns act as industrial/academic agglomerations (for example Tsukuba Science City). These areas attempt to create an all-inclusive environment for daily living, in accordance with Nishiyama Uzo’s “life-spheres” principle[10].


2.2. Problems of new towns: urban sprawl

 It was mentioned above that living estates in downtowns provided a neat and all-inclusive urban environment. By contrast, in the suburban areas outside the estates, urban sprawl, combined with a seemingly chaos of different functions, constitutes the dominant morphological feature. There are two reasons for this.

 First, due to the restriction in inhabitable space and the traditional orientation toward intensive wet-rice agriculture, population densities were high and land uses strongly mixed on the arable plains before urbanization set in.

 Second, urban planning that was to contain urban sprawl proved to be ineffective or either counterproductive. In order to regulate the growth rather than restrain it, the 1968 year’s City Planning Act divided Urbanization Promotion Areas and Urbanization Control Areas[11]. In the later one, urbanization “must not be carried out for 10 years after deregulation”. But several exceptions undermined this policy. For instance, “agriculture-related development” could also include schools, hospitals and other facilities. Thereby urban sprawl was promoted even before the area is actually incorporated into an Urbanization Promotion area.

 Owing to low propriety taxes on agricultural land, most farmers tended to sell off their land gradually (piece by piece), thus keeping the supply of land low and the land prices high. Under these conditions which were an expression of the long-standing political power of farming and land-owning interest in Japan, a large-scale and orderly development for suburban land was almost impossible.


 Japan's New Town program consisted many diverse projects, most of which focus on a primary function, but also aspire to create an all-inclusive urban environment. Japan’s New Town program is heavily informed by the Anglo-American Garden City tradition and American neighborhood design. Originally, new towns were imagined as greenbelt; however, this vision was given up because of the opposition of locals. Living estates got the purpose to be bed-towns and local community and facility organization remained very limited.

After the war, American practices on suburbs and nuclear family as a basic got a serious effect on Japanese’s concept[12]. As this kind of family as a target, living estate buildings began in the outskirts of cities and several citizens moved to this kind of places.


2.3. Problems of new towns:  ageing of population

People who had their own business, and workers stayed inside the town. In the 1970s establishment of business facilities also began in suburbs, but also the “donut phenomenon” began[13]. Districts around the city centre gradually declined. From 1980s, several facilities moved to the suburbs, and more automobiles were used for commuting to the center. Bypasses were built and public transportation by bus became more important. For a time, this led to suburbs with a bigger population than the downtown itself. Than, the next stage of urbanization was the phenomenon called “going back to the town”. This means that more and more office buildings in town are used as mansions. After the bubble, real estate prizes went down. This way, supply of real estates in town increased. By declination of land prices in town areas, the population had a tendency to move back into the city closer to town center. This sequel’s background is the new concentration of population and facilities; re-evaluation of city districts which value declined before; competition between global cities, and by this, deregulation and tax exemptions.


 Finally, the newest sequel of Japanese urbanization is the decline of population in the living estate of new towns. That is connected to the so-called “problem of the year 2007” is the phenomenon that baby boom generation’s greater proportion retired, combined with the declining population of new towns/living estates. As Taniguchi poses an example for this problem, here, this one will be also cited. That is, the example of Tama New Town as the present situation of Japanese suburbs.


2.4. An example: Tama New Town

 Tama New Town is a large residential development, straddling the municipalities of Hachioji, Tama, Inagi and Machida cities, in Tokyo[14]. Tama New Town was designed as a new town in 1965. It is approximately 14 kilometers long stretching east-west, and between 1 and 3 kilometers wide, located in an expanse of hills known as Tama Hills about 20 kilometers west of the center of the special wards of Tokyo. Currently it has a population of about 200.000, making it the largest housing development in Japan.

 As it was explained above, during the Japanese post-war economic miracle, a rapid influx of population into Tokyo led land prices high, causing many to settle on the cheaper outskirts of the city, leading to an unplanned, rapid urban sprawl. It was feared that, left to its own devices, the uncontrolled expansion of built-up areas would lead to poorly planned communities with insufficient infrastructure to support the population and with poor access to amenities and transport. Tama New Town was planned in 1965 to attempt to ease this pressure by providing hundreds of thousands of housing in a planned, pleasant urban environment. The planning and development was carried out jointly by The Housing and Urban Development Corporation, Tokyo Metropolitan Housing Supply Corporation and Tokyo Metropolitan Government.

The original planned population was 342.200, and the designated area was 2.892.1 hectares. Construction began the following year and the first phase opened in 1971. Construction continued in phases for the next few decades.


 As a result of all of these processes, suburbs tended to have a bigger population than the downtown itself. Recently, this movement became slower, but “replacing problems” like the aging of the population of living estates, the declining of children’s number and by this, the problem of reorganizing schools, also, the worsening state of the original buildings of estates appeared. These problems mostly concentrated to rental living estates. Originally the children of migrants who moved to new towns in the 1960s tend to move to other places, also, number of children is declining. As there are not much newcomers, and also no rising generations in these living facilities, this causes the simultaneous aging of the population. For instance, in Shinjuku-ku, Toeito Danchi, the average age of inhabitants is over 65 years[15], especially in the case of distant living estates. In these places, there are no more newcomers and children tend to move to elsewhere. Those who moved there is the 60’s were approximately in the same life-stage – this way, their ages are also about the same. So now they are aging for the same time.


2.4. “The Difficulties of Japan” and suburbanization

 A remarkable evaluation of urbanization and social change process can be found in the book “The Difficulties of Japan” by Miyadai Shinji[16]. According to his opinion, as a result of the urbanization process, “society lost its bottom”. What he calls the bottom of society is a change from local community communications to impersonal more alienated official communications. Using the terminology of Habermas, Miyadai identifies “life-world” with the economics of local family owned small firms, and identifies “the system” with convenience store chains (or shopping malls). This change is a result of suburbanization, which occurred in two steps in Japan. The first step is from the 1950s till the 1970s, symbolized by the establishment of large-scale living estates and “principal occupation plus housewife” system. This caused the decline of local community and shrink back to the family’s sphere. The second step, from the 1970s till nowadays, is symbolized by the establishment of new towns and the spread of convenience stores. This caused a decline of family and more reliance on market and public administration. In other words, urbanization from the 1970s can be called “suburbanization” and “newtownization”. Once again, the prominent feature of the recent sequels is the establishment of convenience store chains and shopping malls in the outskirts of towns[17].


 Japanese-American relations also changed in this period. Especially from the end of 1980’s, beginning with the problem of the free trade restriction of agricultural goods, continuing with the so-called “Structural Impediment Initiative” from 1989, this topic leads us to the problem of deregulation.



3. Deregulation – a globalization impact?


 Why could shopping malls and convenience store chains appear in suburbs in this large pattern? The answer is “because of deregulation”.


 Basically, deregulation means the abolishment of existing economic rules, and privatization means changing the former state ownership to private one. It is widely known that this political orientation and guideline began in the 1980s United Kingdom and United States (the first example is the deregulation of airlines by Carter administration in 1978), with a recall for a “smaller state” and a “smaller government”. This was the basic pattern, and several other states followed these measures after the 1990s, sometimes on the basement of very different reasoning[18].


3.1. The history of Japanese deregulation

 In the case of Japan, this progress began under the government of Prime Minister Nakasone (1982-1987) with the emphasizing of the importance of “small government”. In this period, several state-owned activities were privatized, including the privatization of the Japan Railways (JR), Japan Tobacco and Salt Public Corporation (JT), and Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation (NTT). Japanese privatization was originally not considered as important as deregulation[19] (most of the analyzing publications choose the topic of “deregulation” and not “privatization”) – which is different from the Central-European example, where privatization appeared to be the more important one and deregulation as rather additional. In the case of the United States, of course, both appeared for the same time. The so-called “Structural Impediment Initiative[20]” (1990-1993), as a bilateral negotiation forum for the US and Japan, partly also served the purpose to push Japan into the direction of more market liberalization.

 The first large-scale deregulation plan appeared under the government of Hosokawa Morihito (1993-1994). This plan is called “Hiraiwa Report” after the name of a leader the Economic Planning Research Group which submitted this report for request of the government. A preliminary version of the report emphasizes the benefits of deregulation: “new industries will be born” “better employment rates” “a greater opportunity for consumers to choose between products and services” “balance between inner and outer level of prices” “by free competition” “more transparency” and “more international peace”. The range of deregulation must broad welfare, education, employment and finance[21]. After these policies, the basic principle is self-responsibility, and the exception is regulation. The final version sets the range even wider, also includes land, real estates, housing, circulation of goods, agriculture and information industry[22].


3.2. Deregulation of Shopping Malls in Suburbs

 In connection with the present topic of suburbs and local communities, let us summarize the change of Japanese regulation on suburbs and local economic activities. The easing of “big-scale shopping facility rules” made the spread of shopping malls easier. Historically, the spreading of supermarkets began with the 1937 year act on economic regulations, or as it is known, “the first department store law”. In the Second World War, state regulations became stricter and these conditions did not let market mechanism work. However, after the war, there was an urgent need to adopt these mechanisms, so monopoly laws were also created, such as the “second department store law” in 1956. With economic growth and capitalist system, the “thing like Wall-Mart” gradually appeared during the years, and it had to be regulated. In order to do this, a new law was accepted in 1973.

 From the 1980’s, however, the process of loosening of rules in the form of deregulation began, urged by OECD and WTO. This international pressure urged an authorization of more opened commercial activity. Japan-US Structural Impediments Initiative Talks were also included into this current. Under this process, the 1973 year “large store act” was amended and three new laws were created, including the three Laws on City Architecture (1998). The regulation of large-scale shopping facilities (daitenho-kisei) was abolished. This way, great shopping malls could spread in suburban areas, as one phenomenon of globalization among others, representing the freedom of market – a motif of libertarianism.

 After these sequels, under the Koizumi administration (2001-2006), deregulation became almost complete[23].


3.3. “Difficulties of Japan” and deregulation    

 Evaluation of Japan’s deregulation policies is hard. There are several debates both from the viewpoint of its reason and from the viewpoint of its effect[24]. However, at least in this very point, the above-mentioned policies show that abolishing the regulation of local economic activities and not regulating urban structures properly, led to a decline of local community.

A typical and relatively famous reflection of this change is the criticism of Uchihashi Katsuto and Group 2001. They state that “deregulation politicians said that new branches of industry are going to born. Of course, they did. Wall Mart, McDonalds, and other fast-food restaurants…those who lost their jobs because of deregulation, could move to these “new industries” – for less money and more menial work[25]”.


 So, according to Miyadai and quoted by Taniguchi, the problem of “dependency from the United States” and “defending the country’s land” arisen more clearly in the end of 1980s. This is connected with the question of “inner intervention” versus economic globalization. “Free movement of capital” movement came from the USA. The concept of internal affairs intervention is that “Japan should be the only winner” in this process.


 More than twenty years ago, Immanuel Wallerstein saw the development of modern economics to a process from productive industries to trade (circulation of goods) and than moving to financial industries. In more details, the age of Structural Impediment Initiative was exactly a time of moving from productive industries to trade (distribution, circulation of goods). This trading is more “system” in this sense, so this movement also shows the colonization of life-world. This change can be also explained as moving from “goodwill and spontaneity, autonomy” to “role and manual”. In this process, society gradually loses its capacity for “inclusion”. However, according to several circles of young critics, these developments are unavoidable because of economic globalization and thus, because of the development of world economy. Defining this development as “unavoidable” is a mistake or what is worse, an ideology. Actually, a proactive action of state, embodied in legislation, made it possible. This is the point where urbanization process and deregulation legislation is connected it the establishment of shopping malls. However, this connection leads to the core theme of this paper: the relevance of shopping malls/convenience stores (“market”) in suburbs/living estates (“community”).



4. The problem’s relevance for legal philosophy and legal philosophy’s relevance in the problem


4.1. Theoretical dimensions

 The problem of political community can be clearly seen in the situation explained above: “…there is only a little need for one’s imagination to see the core questions of legal and political philosophy in the problems of living estates and suburbs, and... in the establishment of large-scale shopping malls. From a viewpoint of a legal philosopher, on the one hand, several problems of living estates as a suburban community, are indirectly connected to communitarianism; on the other hand, the problems of shopping malls and the deregulation of commercial rules are, as they have relevance for the “freedom of market” principle, are connected to libertarianism. In a limited form, a linkage with anarcho-capitalism and even with globalization can be also imagined[26].”


 Or, in a broader viewpoint of common policy-making: the reflection of Rawls’ distributive justice can be seen in the former policies of redistribution of LDP before the 1990’s. It means that according to the differentiation principle, the fruits of rapid economic growth had to benefit not only the urban areas where it was originated, but also the rural areas where its range did not reach. This is an element of egalitarian liberalism. Later, as a critique of these policies, an element of communitarianism and libertarianism both emerged. Under Koizumi administration, on the one hand, deregulation and more reliance on market principle was emphasized, an element of libertarianism. On the other hand, need for the rebuild of the lost community was also emphasized, which reminds to communitarianism[27].


 Michael Sandel states[28] that communitartanism historically emerged in the debate of contemporary justice-theories. In the second half of the 20th century, one of the most notable justice theories is the liberalism of Rawls, supporting and supported by the theory of the welfare state. On the other side of the debate, there is libertarianism, which opposes the role of state, and desires the market to fulfill several state functions. In this sense, “liberty” is more important for it, rather than “egalitarianism”, but liberty here basically means the liberty of market, while the liberalism of Rawls includes the commitment of egalitarianism. However, a common point between the two theories is that both of them, in a form or another, have a commitment for freedom.

 On the other hand, communitariansim is not interested in freedom. For this view, the important thing is community. As community and solidarity is the solution of political problems, it also opposes the welfare state. This way, even if it is different in 180° from libertarianism, they have a common platform. Also, as Morimura Susumu pointed out[29], as libertarianism emphasizes voluntary action, it does not deny that community is an important factor for the individual.


 The conflict of libertarianism and communitarianism can be seen in the label “McWorld”, which is a radical criticism of consumer’s society. Participating in the current, in his paper called “A Place for Us?[30]” Benjamin Barber contrasts three models of social-political entity: the libertarian model, the communitarian model, and the model of “strong democracy”. Within these models of civic society, he argues that the third one is superior to both of the former ones.


 What does Barber regard as “libertarian” and “communitarian”? Firstly, libertarianism is a system where the local civil society is totally “privatized” or “marketized”. Every member seeks only his own economic benefit; instead of “participation”, the basic motivation is “consuming”. In this sense, shopping mall is “a place for me”.

 Secondly, communitarianism is a model of community integration, where the state has to lead, control. The problem is that in this theory, one can see the reminiscence of the Nazi ideology of “Volksgemeinschaft” (community of the people).

 The model what is superior to both of these is called “strong democracy”. This is similar to the one Sandel calls “civic republicanism”. Their common point is the importance of “civic virtue”. Both of them recommend “participation in self-governance”.


 Applying the community theory of Inoue Tatsuo[31], one can interpret Barber’s opinion in the following way. Barber distinguishes his own model from “communitarianism”. This later means the values in the traditions of a certain community, which make self-realization and self-determination to the purpose of politics. This is what Inoue calls “historical community”. In contrast with this, the “strong democracy” model of Barber, “in the community participation of common (public) affairs and the self-governance and self-determination of people, it is searching the bond for cooperativeness of single individuals”[32]. In Inoue’s words, this is “the communitarian model of participatory democracy”.


 There are two points to concern about this theoretical distinction. First, the concept of “historical community” is realist and identifying, while the concept of “strong democracy” is more activist, willing to realize something what hardly existed. Second, the model what Barber calls “communitarianism” and thus he rejects it as inferior, cannot be regarded bad if it is also includes a participatory democratic system.


4.2. Conditions of a community

 The point of the whole argument and its link to suburbs and shopping malls is the following. According to Barber, there are several conditions in order to reach “strong democracy”, but the first and foremost of them is a “community space” is required. In contemporary society where “communizing of governmental functions” and “suburbanization” is proceeding, what is the place where civil society can operate freely? There is not enough physical space for it. However, the question is whether this common space (“a place for us”) can be the giant shopping malls in suburbs. Even if malls are designed for commercial and consumer activities, maybe they can transform into a place for community purposes. Paco Underhill asks[33]: why do people like shopping malls? The answer is that because people began to use them as a community place, for activities of community. For instance, there are also many new towns in the United Kingdom which did not incorporate a traditional style town centre but instead developed a shopping centre. Unlike the shopping malls which were developing in established towns and cities, these also contained many civic functions and other community facilities such as libraries, pubs and community centrums. As the towns grew, other facilities were usually developed around the malls, effectively enlarging the town centers.


 Even the freedom of speech was emphasized as an obligation of shopping malls. One controversial aspect has been their effective displacement of traditional main streets. Many consumers prefer malls, with their spacious parking garages, entertaining environments, and private security guards, over downtowns, which frequently suffer from limited parking, poor maintenance, and limited police coverage.

 In response, a few jurisdictions have expanded the right of freedom of speech to ensure that speakers will be able to reach consumers who prefer to shop, eat, and socialize within the boundaries of privately owned malls[34].


 Summarizing the problem, is there a possibility that the “participation” motif itself in Barber’s “strong democracy” model is a historical reference? In the United States, from the constitutional process till the 19th century, the so-called “republicanism” system also meant “self-governance”, in this sense, “participation”. Republicanism had an oppositional relationship with libertarianism. So, there is a possibility that we can speak about the historical link of “historical community” and “participatory model of communitarian democracy”.

 Barber’s slogan of communitarianim looks like a call to “resurrect our good old community”. For him, among several authors, historical community seems to be a utopia, while contemporary suburbs are portrayed as dystopia. Of course none of them, it is just an emergence of several new questions.


 The core of these questions is the connection of market and community, being aware of the existence of the state. Or: the rethinking of the connection of market and political community[35]. Civilians who are to participate politics, in this sense the local decision-making or “will-forming/decision-making” procedure, appear as simply “consumer” in the eyes of the market – as this, they are highly vulnerable beings[36]. Basically, there is nothing local community can act under these circumstances. Or rather, the effect of market prevents local society to create a “place for us”, a place for local community action. Without this kind of political socialization, community virtue and action for the community can not be born.


 Therefore, the question is what kind of theoretical solutions can be imagined. Two possibilities are pointed out in the papers of Taniguchi: one is re-regulation (the emphasis of regulatory framework), and the other is the education of community of public virtue, therefore a politics of social inclusion. It is important to point out that they should be combined in application; at least they can be understood as each other’s condition. First, let us explain about the role of state regulation in the creation of community.



5. The role of state regulation


With the words of Taniguchi,


“Ogyu Sorai[37] writes that “if a course of the river is not fixed, even if the legendary king Yu is reborn, the flood can not be controlled.” If there is no rule and coordination, people can not be protected. Similarly, if there is no state [regulation], home(town) can not be maintained. As an existing object, existence of the state is the condition of the Being (Sein [in Heidegger’s sense]) of home(town)[38].”


 The conclusion of “The Distance of State and Home” is clear: as the entity which can still create effective regulation is the country, therefore, a coordination and regulation must be exercised. Instead of de-regulation, a re-regulation is needed, at least in this area. In a highly theoretical level, this means that only “civic virtue” (which will be explained later) is not enough; a regulatory framework is required.


5.1. Propriety rights in Japan and the paradox of community protection

 An interesting and important example for this is the concept of land propriety right in Japan. According to the research of Terao Yoshiko[39], Japanese practice on propriety right of land “is a burden on city facilities, and became a legal right which puts most of the external costs on the society”. Propriety right in this case is “propriety as a right for rebuttal against group decisions”.     


 As in the case of other states which have laws or regulations on land ownership, in Japan, land propriety right can be restricted for “important reason”. According to the result of a 1988 year survey[40], the proportion of those who agreed that restriction of land propriety right for a common good or public reason is acceptable, was only 38.7% in Japan. This is overwhelmingly low, compared to America (68.2%), England (67.9%) and Germany (59.2%). Even in Taiwan, there were almost two times bigger than in Japan[41].


 So, a problem has risen. The reason of cities planning failure is 1. Strong land propriety right causes weak regulative intervention from the state, or 2. Reason of strong land propriety right is the weak state intervention?


 Obviously, the regulatory capacity of state is limited; however, its limits mostly depend on political decisions. Briefly, “globalization” and its (dis)contents are often regarded as an unavoidable flow or current; however, it must be pointed out that neo-liberal measures always need state legitimacy and state approval first.


 In this point, Taniguchi proposes the paradox of community protection. While community and civil society is a free association of civilians, defending the community requires the authoritative intervention of state/regulation. This creates a paradox situation.

 For the time being, only one aspect of the paradox will be mentioned. That is, the condition of community creation. In general sense, communities can be formed on the basic of a territory, or on the basic of free entrance (on personal base). It is emphasized that in the case of Japan, territory principle is relatively strong compared to other countries[42].


5.2. Communities in history and their regulatory conditions

 Generally speaking, ‘historical communities’ used to living places mostly organized on the base of ‘mechanical solidarity’, which can be also understood as “territory principle”. For instance, when Aristotle argues with the theory of ‘autarkia’ (“the level which is enough in itself”), in a practical sense, this would be the community of the polis whose population can create every condition of their lifestyle by themselves, mostly in an economical meaning. So an ancient community of a city is a place which (in an ideal case) can not be left, and it appears to individuals as a given condition. Thus, economic-environmental conditions create a human community. But as technical facilities become more developed, and societies become more complex, this kind of ‘community as a given condition’ state fades away, and individuals have a greater scope of freedom at least in choosing those communities where they want to belong. This phenomenon, the growth of autonomy, sometimes can be also a cause of self-alienation and anomy.


 The point is that whether a local community, under the level of the nation state (which provides the institutional background of modern participatory democracy), can operate in the political ground, and determine its own lifestyle? If we regard politics as simply a “community action”, or an action in public cases, we can say that it can. According to the research of Lutzeler and Ben-Ari[43], local communities are extremely active in Japan, but at the same time, their activities are restricted to certain cases; in other words, community operation is ad hoc and moved from relatively close-knit localities to voluntary participation. One could say that it is a development from mechanical to organic solidarity, or, at the same time, from Gemeinschaft to Geschellschaft.


 As Taniguchi also states, these developments have some connection with globalization, although only in a limited form. Most of the phenomena quoted in the above paragraphs had begun long ago, and recent trends in economics or social changes only fastened them. The ‘community’ which receives the most effect from globalization is the ‘imagined community’ of the nation state. So, if globalization has an effect on democracies, it is an effect on the scope of action in the framework of legitimate institutions and processes of the central level of nation states. According to several views in political philosophy, participatory democracy can be imagined only in the framework of the nation state[44], thus, the “being” (existence) of “state” is certainly a condition of the “being” of “home”. In other words, the utmost problem of globalization with democracies is that the space of political action remains in the level of nation state, while hardly-identified global power acts in a level above. That is the question ‘global governance’ models try to deal with.


 But the problem in broader sense is that what can be the connection of localities with globalization. Can one speak about “regionalization” for the same time? In this topic, regionalization theories are created, for instance the theory of social region by the Belgian-Hungarian sociologist Bango Jeno[45]. This theory also has some communitarist and post-materialist (in other words, anti-consumerist) tendencies. However, in Luhmannian base, this theory states that today’s society is a “world society”, where one can not speak about core and periphery (as Luhmann also never analyzed inequality of social classes), only “social regions” – a statement which seems to be problematic in several points. For instance, is it verifiable that there is no core and periphery anymore? Because if there is no core and periphery anymore, why is there a viable difference between developed and developing countries? If there are this kind of inequality in distribution of goods, how can one speak about the formation of a united “world society”? In other words, this analysis of regionalization is rather an expectation to the future than an explanation of the present. 


 Because of ethnical and language reasons, it is questionable that regions can be formed across country borders[46]. And within the framework of the existing countries, it is questionable what relevance a region can have except the area of economy. Regions (localities) would “localize” globalization with more political participation and action for the community? For the time being, this achievement seems to be doubtful. If this is doubts have any base that would be critical array for communitarianism, as communitarians also emphasize anti-etatism, and the same time, a hope in community. However, in order to keep the order in our world, a careful system planning is also needed, at least to provide an establishment for these values. These kinds of systematic factors could be a compulsory condition of the creation in “civic virtue”. In this point, let us see the other possible solution: strengthening social inclusion and virtue.



6. Community/political virtue and social inclusion


 As it was already mentioned above in connection with the thought of Miyadai’s “Problems of Japan”, “defending the country” includes several policies, not only military defense (although Miyadai offers a policy direction more independent from the US, also in the sense of military). What he implies here is “social inclusion”. This means that society must be supported by the state, not because to make itself more powerful, but oppositely: in order to make society more strong and independent from the state. This is a concept called “social investment state” and first it was sketched up by Douglas Hart and Anthony Giddens. In order to reach it, education gets an utmost importance. The keyword of this kind of education is the cultivation of virtuous beings. In this new relationship between individual and the state, there is no authority and subservience. Also, if this vision becomes reality, resistance and opposition are not needed anymore. However, this theory has the same problem of communitarianism. Namely, it is the problem of virtue.


 The basic problem of a society’s political culture is that a concept of “common good” or “common concept of good life” in liberal politics. Virtue is needed in order to reach it, but virtue is also a presumption of it. This is an unsolved question even in the works of great liberal political thinkers like John Rawls. Also, this is the point where communitarianism mostly criticizes liberalism. (However, even Rawls had a “turn” in the end of his life. In “Political Liberalism”, he emphasizes the importance of common values, lies in the basic structure or culture in every single society[47].)


6.1. Virtue in East-Asia?

 So, so far there is no answer for the problem of “virtue” – both tradition-based and participation-based communitarianism poses this question. Another problem is what if not everyone can get this kind of virtuousness? As self-interest following homo oeconomicus, or the image of the rational human being in the sense of economics is an important part of us; despite it, idealized virtue asks people to act “irrationally” in this sense, as a way against their own selfish interest. If only one part of the people can reach it, political thought becomes a kind of seriously idealized elite-theory.


 Similarly to this, in the case of Japan, Taniguchi poses an example for a modernized application of Neo-Confucian thought as a cultivation of “virtue”, citing Daniel A. Bell’s book “East Meet West[48], where this opinion also appears. In this volume, written in a dialogue form, the third part consist a theory of state which embraces liberal democracy; however, also embraces the East-Asian traditions of emphasis on virtue, thus, proposes an abstract solution for the communitarian problem. Democracy is the basic framework; but at the same time, this system would be an institutionalization of a rule of the intellectual elite[49]. Traditionally, this kind of cultivation was supplied by the examination system of Confucianism. Creating the intellectual elite, with an open way to enter to everyone (in accordance with the first principle of justice by Rawls[50]), or as the late Ming – early Qing period Confucian scholar Huang Zongxi said, “Council of bureaucrat-scholars”. By the way, Huang was notable for being one of the first Neo-Confucians to stress the need for constitutional law. He also openly advocated the belief that ministers should be openly critical of their emperor; and that rulers held a responsibility to their country. Moreover, an emperor should respect the concerns of his prime minister and head of the Imperial College. In local areas, the local gentry, scholars, and students should gather and form an assembly to discuss issues openly with local magistrates and officials.


 A provocative and similar question is whether this “virtue” could be the Jewish-Christian tradition in the case of Europe and the USA. At least, there were attempts to refer to the Christianity in the future Constitution of the European Community. However because of the wide-spread recognition of the liberal principle of “public accessibility”, it is hard to realize. Also, it is questionable whether it is worth to be realized. But in any case, the crisis cannot be solved this way. A very similar problem orientation can be seen in the dialogue of Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, cardinal of the Catholic Church (2004)[51], where the basic question was that pluralistic democratic state is based on normative presumptions which cannot be created by the democratic institutions themselves. Of course in any case, the present system of liberal democracy presumptions that liberal image of human being and the political framework formed on this basement, is not mistaken. According to the criticism of John Kekes, liberalism in general has a typically optimistic image of the individual human being; it means that “evil” or “bad” is not done by autonomous actions[52]. However, this is only a belief or presumption which should be verified. Instead of regarding atomistic human nature simply “good”, human nature should be regarded as it is – contradictious. For this critique, also posed by Charles Taylor[53], the answer can be that “Rawls’ liberalism does not have a certain anthropological view”[54]. However, even if it is truth and even if this argument can help to defend the integrity of the theory, it does not matter in the sense that it will not change reality, and will not change policies based on this kind of political philosophy. Reality is still the fact that it is not proved whether human nature is good or bad, or, according to several post-modernist, there is no thing such as “human nature[55]”.


6.2. Common values under the “fact of pluralism”

 It was underlined that state regulation is possible within a certain scope, at least in the case of community creation. However, nurturing a common virtue is a partly different problem; at least, in the best case it can be the result of favorable regulatory environment. If society is plural in reality, and political parties do not have a basic common commitment, then this kind of cultivation would eventually fail. In other words, a presumption of the consensus on cultivation is an already existing consensus. Competitive political elites first must reach a sense of common commitment. Therefore, cultivation can be hardly applied in most of the countries which lack a basic political culture of common good. At the same time, “cultivation for having everyone’s own values and accept other’s different values” does not give a guideline on what values should people exactly have. Of course, in liberal views, human autonomy is a basic value, and liberal view of human being is based on the belief that growing more autonomy will help people to the right direction – as human nature is basically good, giving more autonomy for the individual also means that individuals would accept each other and create their own values, where the pursue for the “freedom of the other” is also included.


 However, this argument is only theoretic. It can be criticized that this kind of policy in practice merely maintains the present state – this way, already existing dominant values simply remain dominant and there is no basic common understanding. Or, as it was recognized by Rawls in his late years, an overlapping consensus is always supposed to be in the society. These would be contained by the values of “civic virtue”.


 At the same time, communitarianism’s “strong democracy” theory, which would be based on common values, seems to be a traditionalist utopia. Present political reality is neo-liberalism with elements from liberal democracy, social democracy, and welfare state (egalitarian liberalism) – depending on the actual political context of one country[56]. No one can answer to the question “what framework should be used as an evaluation of good life”. The thought that “at least leaders should have values” seems to be also utopist in practice. Present structures already cultivated a certain type of political culture – in some countries, a democratic, in others, a more autocratic or semi-democratic one.


 Summarizing the problem, while liberalism says that the purpose of political institutions is to provide more autonomy for individuals, a framework of community is needed; otherwise, people’s connection will become “everyone’s fight with everyone”. This framework can be only provided by a vision of “common good”, or an acceptance of the other’s interest, the utmost desire to give “freedom to the other”. This should be formed by “civic virtue”, a factor that cannot be born without a certain range of consensus. However, how can we reach consensus in a plural society? This is the work what a favorable regulatory environment should do. But regulation already needs a basic (or, using the phrase of Rawls, “overlapping”) consensus. Is there any possible objective basement of evaluation for this regulation, in order to reach “virtue” for creating community for “common good”?


 At least, Taniguchi’s paper points out that there is no objective basement for the values; they can be changed from place to place, and time to time. However, an effective regulation is always needed to form the background of the values. Values can be grounded in a certain range of consensus in the society. Without regulation, this “restricted consensus” can not be born, just as without the control of the rivers, Yu, the mythical king can not be born. Regardless whether the consensus is restricted by cultural traditions or restricted by a certain type of economic-political system.






BANGO Jeno (2005): Role and Function of Regional Differences in the World Society from the Point of View of Modern Luhmannian Systems Theory. (“Socio-region” as proposed correction), http://jesz.ajk.elte.hu/bango22.html


BARBER, Benjamin (1998): A Place for Us – How to Make Civil Society and Democracy Strong, Hill and Wang Pub.


BELL, Daniel A. (2000): East Meets West: Human Rights and Democracy in East Asia, Princeton


BOOKCHIN, Murray (1992): Urbanization without Cities - The Rise and Decline of Citizenship; Black Rose Books, Montreal


DOTEUCHI Akio and SHIRAISHI Masumi (2007): Aging Issues in New Town Developments The Tama New Town Case


HABERMAS, Jürgen and RATZINGER, Joseph (2005): The Dialectics of Secularization, San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press


HEBBERT, Michael (1994): Urban Sprawl and Urban Planning in Japan, Liverpool University Press


HEIN, Carola (2003): “Visionary Plans and Planners: Japanese Traditions and Western Influences” in: Japanese Capitals in Historical Perspective, Nicholas FIÉVÉ and Paul

WALEY, eds. New York: Routledge Curzon, 309-43.


INOUE Tatsuo (1995): Tasha e no Jiyuu, Sobunsha


INOUE Tatsuo (2001): Gendai no Hinkon, Iwami Shoten


KEKES, John (1997): Against Liberalism, Cornell University Press


KREINER, Joseph - MÖHRWALD, Ulrich - ÖLSCHLEGER, Hans Dieter: Modern Japanese Society, Leiden : Brill


KUSANO Atsushi (1999): Deregulation in Japan and the Role of Naiatsu, Social Science Journal Japan Vol. 2 No. 1, 65-84


LÜTZELER, Ralph - BEN-ARI, Eyal: Urban society in Japan, in: Modern Japanese Society, page 280-295


MARZLUFF, John M (2008): Urban ecology: an international perspective, Springer Science


MIYADAI Shinji (2008): Nihon no Nanten, Gentosha Shinsho


MORIMURA Susumu (2005): Libertarianism dokusho, Keiso Shobo


MURAYAMA Yuuji (2000): Japanese Urban System, Kluwer Academic Publishers


NAKA Norio (1996): Predicting Outcomes of Japan-USA Trade Negotiations, Quorum Books


NAKANO Takeshi (2010): Seicho naki jidai no “kokka” wo koso suru, Nakashiya Shuppan


NAKATANI Iwao and OOTA Hiroko (1994): Keizaiseisaku no vision – Hiraiwa repoto wo koete, Toyokeizai Shinhosha


OYAMA Mahito (2008): Danchi ga shindeiku, Heibonsha


POGONYI, Szabolcs (2008): The Rawls-criticism of Charles Taylor, Phronesis (in Hungarian: Charles Taylor Rawls-kritikája)


SANDEL, Michael (1996): Democracy’s Discontent, Harvard UP


SATO Toshiki (2000): Fubyodoshakai Nihon: sayonara tochuryu, Chuokoronshinsha


SCRUTON, Roger (2004): The Need for Nations, Civitas


SHAPIRA, Philip – MASSER, Ian – EDGINGTON, David W. (1994): Planning for cities and regions in Japan, Liverpool University Press


SONOBE Masahisa (2001): Gendai Daitashishakairon: bunkyokuka suru toshi?, Toshinto


SORENSEN, Andre (2004): The Making of Urban Japan: Cities and Planning From Edo to the Twenty-first Century, Routledge


TANIGUCHI Koichi (2009a): Shoppingu Moru no Hotetsugaku (in: Ratio 06, Kodansha)


TANIGUCHI Koichi (2009b): Kokka to Kokyo no Awai/Danpen (in: Riso, Risosha)


TANIGUCHI Koichi (2009c): Shiminteki Kokyosei no Shinwa/Genjitsu, Soshite… (in: Iwami Koza Tetsugaku 10, Iwami Shoten)


TANIGUCHI, Koichi (2010): Kyodotai to Toku (in: NAKANO Takeshi (2010): Seicho naki jidai no “kokka” wo koso suru, Nakashiya Shuppan)


TANIGUCHI Koichi (2010): Globalization and the Destiny of Community. Presentation in the conference of Japanese Association of Legal Philosophy. 2010. 11. 20.


TERANICHI Shunichi et al (1995): Chiikishakai no kozo to henyo: Tama New Town no sogokenkyu, Chukyo Daigaku Shuppanbu 


TAUBNER, Irene (1958): The Population of Japan, Princeton University Press


TAYLOR, Charles (1985): Philosophy and the Human Sciences, Cambridge


UCHIHASHI Katsuto et al (2002): Kiseikanwa to iu akumu, Bunshun


WALEY, Paul (2003): Japanese Capitals in Historical Perspective: Place, Power and Memory in Edo, Routledge


[1] Taniguchi Koichi (2009a): Shoppingu Moru no Hotetsugaku “The Legal Philosophy of Shopping Malls” (in: Ratio 06, Kodansha)

  Taniguchi Koichi (2009b): Kokka to Kokyo no Awai/Danpen “The Distance/Friction of State and Home” (in: Riso, Risosha)

  Taniguchi Koichi (2009c): Shiminteki Kokyosei no Shinwa/Genjitsu, Soshite… “The Myth of Civic Publicity/The Reality, and Then…” (in: Iwami Koza Tetsugaku 10, Iwami Shoten)

  Taniguchi, Koichi (2010): Kyodotai to Toku “Community and Virtue” (in: Nakano Takeshi (2010): Seicho naki jidai no “kokka” wo koso suru, Nakashiya Shuppan)

  Taniguchi Koichi (2010 presentation): Globalization and the Destiny of Community. Presentation in the annual conference of Japanese Association of Legal Philosophy. 2010. 11. 20. 

[2] This later one is the question posed in Taniguchi 2009b

[3] Also by using several methods of law and literature

[4] General literature used for this section: Sorensen, Andre (2004): The Making of Urban Japan: Cities and Planning From Edo to the Twenty-first Century, Routledge; Waley, Paul (2003): Japanese Capitals in Historical Perspective: Place, Power and Memory in Edo, Routledge; Murayama Yuuji  (2000): Japanese Urban System, Kluwer Academic Publishers


[5]Kreiner, Joseph - Möhrwald, Ulrich - Ölschleger, Hans Dieter (2001): Modern Japanese Society, Leiden : Brill, page 280

[6] See: Lützeler, Ralph – Ben-Ari, Eyal (2001): Urban society in Japan, in: Modern Japanese Society, page 276

[7] Taubner , Irene (1958): The Population of Japan, Princeton University Press, page 168

[8] Hebbert, Michael (1994): Urban Sprawl and Urban Planning in Japan, Liverpool University Press, page 76-88


[9] See: Teranichi, Shunichi et al (1995): Chiikishakai no kozo to henyo: Tama New Town no sogokenkyu, Chukyo Daigaku Shuppanbu

[10] See: Paul Waley (2003): Japanese Capitals in Historical Perspective: Place, Power and Memory in Edo, Routledge, page 336

[11] John M. Marzluff (2008): Urban Ecology: an international perspective on the interaction between human and nature, page 789

[12] On the effect of the United States, see Miyadai Shinji (2008): Nihon no Nanten, Gentosha Shinsho, page 32-33

[13] Inhabitants’ movement to outskirts, see later in details

[14] Data from Doteuchi Akio and Shiraishi Masumi (2007): Aging Issues in New Town Developments The Tama New Town Case, http://www.nli-research.co.jp/english/socioeconomics/1998/li9805.html Downloaded: 2011. 03. 10


[15] See: Oyama Mahito (2008): Danchi wa shindeiku, “Estates are Dying”, Heibonsha, especially 18-42. This book introduces the features of Tama New Town, and as its title also says, a phenomenon called “lonely death” (old inhabitants die alone, after their spouse already passed away and their children moved out of the estates) and also, the aging of the buildings.

[16] Miyadai Shinji (2008): Nihon no Nanten, “The Difficulties of Japan”, Gentosha Shinsho. Written by a professor of social theory of Tokyo Metropolitan University, this volume consist his reflections on several social problems in contemporary Japan, mostly using the methods of theoretical sociology.

[17] It is important to point out that in opposite with the common misbelieve, Japanese economic system mostly consist small-range, family-owned companies, and not gigantic concerns. The same time, a special type of corporatism can be seen in the economic system: the being of keirestu-s, i.e. groups of companies with a wide range in size, usually with a bank or financial institution in the centre. 

[18] For instance, Central-European countries followed this guideline because they 1. got it as a political dictate from Western and American side, and 2. had to establish a capitalism after the “existed” socialist system; therefore, there was no place to maintain any features of former socialism, especially in the coming age of neo-liberalism in the 1990’s. (An analysis of this process is Ferber Katalin (2010): Érdemeink beismerése mellett, Jószöveg Mûhely, Budapest) As another possibly different motivation in the case of Japan is the differentiation of “internal pressure” (naiatsu) and “external pressure” (gaiatsu). See Kusano Atsushi (1999): Deregulation in Japan and the Role of Naiatsu, Social Science Journal Japan Vol. 2 No. 1, 65-84

[19] Except the more recent privatization of the Japanese Post Company under Koizumi administration

[20] Structural Impediments Initiative was a series of talks designed to deal with domestic structural problems limiting trade on both sides. After several rounds of often contentious talks, agreements were reached in April and July 1990 that promised major changes in such sensitive areas as Japanese retailing practices, land use, and investment in public works. The United States pledged to deal more effectively with its budget deficit and to increase domestic savings. United States supporters saw the Structural Impediments Initiative talks as addressing fundamental causes of Japan-United States economic friction. Skeptics pointed to them as ways for officials to buy time and avoid an acute crisis in Japan-United States relations. The Bill Clinton administration decided to end the Structural Impediments Initiative in the summer of 1993 as a framework for dealing with United States-Japan bilateral relations. (See: Naka Norio (1996): Predicting Outcomes of Japan-USA Trade Negotiations, Quorum Books)

[21] Uchihashi (2002): “Kiseikanwa to iu akumu”, “The Nightmare called Deregulation”, Bunshun, Furoku, page 5

[22] Ibid, page 14

[23] Taniguchi 2010 states on that “deregulation became complete” (page 193-194)

[24] For instance, see Nakatani Iwao and Oota Hiroko (1994): Keizaiseisaku no vision – Hiraiwa repoto wo koete, Toyokeizai Shinhosha ; Nakano Takeshi (2010): Seicho naki jidai no “kokka” wo koso suru, Nakashiya Shuppan, page 3-24; or footnote 25

[25] Uchihashi Katsuto and Group 2001 (2002): “Kiseikanwa to iu akumu”, “The Nightmare called Deregulation”, Bunshun, 125-127. This volume is written by journalists, thus, it can not be considered as an academic publication. However, as it got some political significance and publicity, and also as it was written consisting some empirical evidence, it is usable as a reference material in the basic research of Japanese deregulation policies.

[26] Taniguchi 2009a, page 59.

[27] Nakano Takeshi (2010): Seicho naki jidai no “kokka” wo koso suru, Nakashiya Shuppan, page 354-355.

[28] Sandel, Michael (1996): Democracy’s Discontent, Harvard UP

[29] Morimura Susumu (2005): Libertarianism dokusho, Keiso Shobo

[30] Barber, Benjamin (1998): A Place for Us – How to Make Civil Society and Democracy Strong, Hill and Wang Pub.

[31] Inoue Tatsuo (1995): Tasha e no jiyuu, Sobunsha

[32] Taniguchi 2010a, page 64

[33] Underhill, Paco (2004): Call of the Mall, Simon & Schluster

[34] See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, a 1970 case in front of the California State Court, which was confirmed by the Supreme Court in 1980

[35] Another problem is: shopping mall can be considered as a public or private space? This question leads to the problem of the holder of publicity, thus it can not be explained in details here.

[36] Taniguchi (2010) presentation

[37] Ogyu Sorai is an important Japanese political thinker and philosopher of Tokugawa Era.

[38] Taniguchi 2009b, page 22

[39] Terao Yoshiko (1997): Toshikibanseibi ni okeru waga kuni kindaiho no genkai – tochi no kokyosei ninshikishutai toshite no koshu no fuzai “The Borders of Japan’s Modernized Law in Rural Facilities – the Missing Common Good in the Identification Subject of Publicity of Land”, Iwami Shoten, quoted in Taniguchi (2010) presentation

[40] Taniguchi (2010) presentation, based on the 1988 year survey of Sorifu (a governmental office of the prime minister)

[41] A possible hypothesis for the reason of this problem is the social position of land owners in Japan.

[42] See: Kreiner- Höhrwald – Ölschleger (2004), page 295

[43] Kreiner-Möhrwald-Ölshleger (2004), page 291

[44]  See for example Roger Scruton (2004): The Need for Nations, Civitas.

[45] Bango Jeno (2005): Role and Function of Regional Differences in the World Society from the Point of View of Modern Luhmannian Systems Theory. (“Socio-region” as proposed correction), http://jesz.ajk.elte.hu/bango22.html The author uses the term “region” instead “local”, as an opposite of “global”.

[46] Even if Bango uses the word “region” in a different sense one: it is a sub-system of the global world society.

[47] Bell, Daniel A. (2000): East Meets West: Human Rights and Democracy in East Asia, Princeton

[48] Bell emphasizes that the possible system introduced in his book is possibly only realizable in Chinese traditions

[49] Of course this kind of “Confucian democracy” requires cruel competition by official examinations and a huge amount of resources in order to take them by success

[50] It may seem to be paradox, but this kind of “Confucian democracy” would not be in contradiction with the principles of justice by Rawls. As it was already mentioned above, if offices are open for everyone, the first principle is in effect. At the same time, by the effective usage of public policies, the second principle can be also realized. This feature shows us that the two principles may fail to create a “fair” society. For instance, in this kind of Confucianism, the example of Joseon Dynasty Korea can be posed. In this period, everyone could enter Yangban class, however, only Yangban children had the resources to actually take the examinations with success.

[51] Habermas, Jürgen and Ratzinger, Joseph (2005): The Dialectics of Secularization, San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press

[52] See: Kekes, John (1997): Against Liberalism, Cornell University Press

[53] Taylor, Charles: Atomism, in: Charles Taylor (1985): Philosophy and the Human Sciences, Cambridge

[54] As this argument was actually used in a paper See: Pogonyi, Szabolcs (2008): The Rawls-criticism of Charles Taylor, Phronesis, page 26 (in Hungarian)

[55] See for instance the opinion of Michel Foucault in his dialogue with Noam Chomsky. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S0SaqrxgJvw (downloaded: 2011. 03. 11)

[56] Or, in the case of Japan, the so-called “rule by middle-level interest groups”. Inoue Tatsuo (2001): Gendai no Hinkon, Iwami Shoten, page 161-166